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HELP OR HAMP(ER)?—THE COURTS’ 
RELUCTANCE TO PROVIDE THE RIGHT TO A 
PRIVATE ACTION UNDER HAMP AND ITS 
DETRIMENTAL EFFFECT ON HOMEOWNERS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is 2006:  You have been living in your new home with your spouse 
and children for two years.  You have a good job and the economy is 
thriving.  You are living the American dream and are proud of yourself 
for making a good conservative investment in your future by purchasing 
a home.  The early years of the millennium have been a time of rapid 
economic growth for Americans, and it appears that there is no end in 
sight.1  However, unbeknownst to you and your family, the banking 
industry has been engaging in questionable lending practices, which will 
dramatically change your future. 2 
Two years pass and it is 2008:  These questionable lending practices 
have finally caught up with the banking industry.  Specifically, many of 
the largest financial institutions in the world have lost billions due to bad 
mortgage, finance, and real estate investments.3  Bear Stearns is the first 
major lending group to fall.4  Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy.5  
                                                 
1 See generally Alvin C. Harrell, The Great Credit Contraction:  Who, What, When, Where and 
Why, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1209, 1214–37 (2010) (discussing the credit and housing boom of 
1993–2006 and the factors that led to the boom). 
2 See Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis:  Lessons from the Lackluster 
First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 744–47 
(2010) (discussing the rise of securitization and third party servicing).  The author 
illustrates an inverse correlation between foreclosure rates and the conservativeness of 
lending practices between the 1950’s and 1998.  Id. at 744–45.  See also Juliet M. Moringiello, 
Mortgage Modification, Equitable Subordination, and the Honest but Unfortunate Creditor, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1607–13 (2011) (discussing the changes in lending practices over the 
course of the twenty-first century). 
3 See generally Credit Crisis Timeline, CREDIT WRITEDOWNS, 
http://www.creditwritedowns.com/credit-crisis-timeline/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2012) 
(providing a timeline as to the credit crisis from “HSBC shock announcement begins the 
pre-panic phase” in February 2007 to “Q4 after the panic” in December 2008).  See generally 
Cheryl Evans, What Makes You So Special?  Ending the Credit Rating Agencies’ Special Status 
and Access to Confidential Information, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 1091 (2012) (discussing how ratings 
firms contributed to the financial meltdown). 
4 See Kate Kelly, Inside the Fall of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124182740622102431.html. 
5 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted= 
all; The Collapse of Lehman Brothers, THE TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ 
financialcrisis/6173145/The-collapse-of-Lehman-Brothers.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2012) 
(providing an interactive timeline leading up to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and 
the economic crisis in the following twelve months). 
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Merrill Lynch is bought for roughly $50 billion dollars, a fraction of its 
value in 2006.6  The U.S. government seizes control of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.7  And the insurance titan, American International Group 
(“AIG”), appears to be next on the chopping block.8 
Another year has passed, and it is 2009:  Your spouse is suddenly 
unemployed in the midst of an economic recession.  Businesses are doing 
everything possible to cut fat and avoid having to close their own doors.  
Everyone in the family has “tightened their belt,” but you have fallen 
behind on the house payments.  It appears that your home will be 
foreclosed upon.  You hear on the news that the President has developed 
a program called the Home Affordable Modification Program 
(“HAMP”), which is designed to help homeowners facing foreclosure 
adjust their mortgage payments to prevent it.  HAMP is an incentive 
based program in which mortgage servicers can contract with the federal 
government using a Servicer Participation Agreement (“SPA”) and 
various incentives.9  Diligently, you contact your bank about the 
program and fill out the application.  After being told that you qualify 
for the program, you are asked to sign an agreement and enter a trial 
period.  You are told that, if all goes well, your mortgage will be 
modified.  You believe the lender and rely on the agreement for your 
financial planning.  You make all your payments and submit them on 
time.  You properly submit all of your paperwork in a timely manner.  
Your financials qualify you for the program, but the lender chooses to 
                                                 
6 Charlie Gasparino, Bank of America to Buy Merrill Lynch for $50 Billion, CNBC, Sept. 14, 
2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708319/Bank_of_America_to_Buy_Merrill_Lynch_for_ 
50_Billion; Sorkin, supra note 5. 
7 See Neil Irwin & Zachary A. Goldfarb, U.S. Seizes Control of Mortgage Giants, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/ 
07/AR2008090700259.html. 
8 Sorkin, supra note 5; The Collapse of Lehman Brothers, supra note 5. 
9 See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM:  HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF 
NON-GSE MORTGAGES V 3.4, § 13, at 105–10 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Handbook 3.4], 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_34.
pdf (explaining the incentive program associated with HAMP); see also Belyea v. Litton 
Loan Servicing, LLP, No. 10-10931-DJC, 2011 WL 2884964, at *2 (D. Mass. July 15, 2011) 
(stating that the federal government will award servicers three annual $1,000 payments for 
successful modifications under HAMP); John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP:  An 
Overview of the Program and Recent Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 194, 195 
(2011) (providing an overview of which types of servicers are enrolled in HAMP).  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac backed mortgages are required to participate in HAMP, but many 
other servicers have enrolled covering almost eighty-nine percent of all first-lien mortgage 
loans.  Id.  But see Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications:  How Servicer Incentives 
Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755, 827–30 (2011) (arguing that  the 
“incentives” HAMP uses to entice servicers for modification are not effective and that even 
when the modification would be profitable servicers often believe foreclosure to be of more 
value). 
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foreclose on your property anyway.10  Now what?  Do you have any 
remedies? 
This is the issue facing many homeowners who have participated in 
HAMP.11  Even after participation in the program, homeowners faced 
with foreclosure have two options.  They can:  (1) wait and see what 
actions the federal government takes to ensure that more homeowners 
are securing permanent modifications,12 or (2) attempt to take private 
action against the mortgage servicers themselves.13 
                                                 
10 This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author. 
11 See, e.g., Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure:  Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affairs, 111th Cong. 9–11 (2010) (written testimony 
of Diane E. Thompson, National Consumer Law Center),  
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/testimony-
senate-banking.pdf (providing multiple examples of homeowners and the issues they have 
faced while participating in HAMP); Kevin G. Hall, Homeowners Often Rejected Under 
Obama’s Loan Plan, MCCLATCHY, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/ 
2009/12/17/80867/homeowners-often-rejected-under.html (featuring a story about 
Evangelina Flores of California who, after having completed the HAMP required Trial 
Period Plan and believing herself to be out of the woods, was greeted by two individuals 
informing her that they had bought her house and were evicting her); Kevin G. Hall, 
Mortgage Modifications Are Still Messed Up, 4 Years Later, MCCLATCHY, Sept. 29, 2011, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/29/125642/mortgage-modifications-are-
still.html#storylink=omni_popular (discussing a similar story in which Jose Polamo’s home 
was foreclosed upon even after being told that he was approved for a mortgage loan 
modification); Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosure Relief?  Don’t Hold Your Breath, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/business/foreclosure-relief-dont-
hold-your-breath-fair-game.html?emc=eta1 (criticizing HAMP and programs like it). 
12 See Braucher, supra note 2, at 770–88 (providing background as to the contractual 
relationship between the federal government and mortgage servicers, as well as providing 
suggested actions the government could take to improve upon the disappointingly low 
number of permanent loan modifications under HAMP).  See generally Paul Kiel, Secret Docs 
Show Foreclosure Watchdog Doesn’t Bark or Bite, PROPUBLICA, Oct. 4, 2011, 
http://www.propublica.org/article/secret-docs-on-foreclosure-watchdog (describing the 
lack of oversight and enforcement by Freddie Mac in ensuring adherence to HAMP 
regulations by mortgage servicers); Andrew Martin, Big Banks Penalized for Performance in 
Mortgage Modification Program, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
06/10/business/10hamp.html?_r=1&ref=loanmodifications (illustrating actions that have 
already been taken by the federal government against mortgage servicers for “subpar 
performance in administrating a government-sponsored program to modify mortgage 
loans for distressed homeowners”). 
13 See generally Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012); Wigod v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012); Nadan v. Homesales, Inc., No. CV F 
11-1181 LJO SKO, 2011 WL 3584213 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011); Rackley v. JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-387-XR, 2011 WL 2971357 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2011); Stagikas v. 
Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2011); Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Nelson v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 6:10-cv-929-
Orl-35GJK, 2011 WL 545817 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2011); Phipps v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 
CV F 10-2025 LJO SKO, 2011 WL 302803 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011); Bosque v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Mass. 2011); Grill v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 
No. 10-CV-03057-FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 127891 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011); Speleos v. BAC 
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Since 2008, private citizens have brought numerous cases attempting 
to use HAMP regulations as a defense to foreclosure.14  The issues raised 
in these suits are numerous, complex, and dependent on the type of 
foreclosure proceedings utilized in each state.15  This Note focuses on 
                                                                                                             
Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 755 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2010); Khast v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 
No. 10-CV-2168-IEG (JMA), 2010 WL 5115094 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010); Durmic v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-10380-RGS, 2010 WL 4825632 (D. Mass. Nov. 24, 
2010); Sampson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. CV 10-08836 DDP (SSx), 2010 WL 
5397236 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Zoher v. Chase Home Fin., No. 10-14135-CIV, 2010 WL 
4064798 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2010); Nguyen v. BAC Home Loan Servs., LP, No. C-10-01712 
RMW, 2010 WL 3894986 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010); Hammonds v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 
No. EDCV 10-1025 AG (OPx), 2010 WL 3859069 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010); McKensi v. Bank 
of Am., N.A., No. 09-11940-JGD, 2010 WL 3781841 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2010); Hart v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Marques v. Wells 
Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 09-cv-1985-L(RBB), 2010 WL 3212131 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 
2010); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010 WL 2635773 (N.D. Cal. June 
30, 2010); Simmons v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1245 JAH(JMA), 2010 WL 
2635220 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2010); Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-
JAT, 2010 WL 2572988 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010); Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 
09-2066-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2534192 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2010); Benito v. Indymac Mortg. 
Servs., No. 2:09-CV-001218-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 2130648 (D. Nev. May 21, 2010); Lucero v. 
Countrywide Bank N.A., No. 09cv1742 BTM (BLM), 2010 WL 1880649 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 
2010); Villa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10CV81 DMS (WVG), 2010 WL 935680 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 15, 2010); Aleem v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. EDCV 09-01812-VAP (RZx), 2010 WL 
532330 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010); Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 
BTM(BLM), 2009 WL 4981618 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009); Williams v. Geithner, No. 09-1959 
ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380 (D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2009); Reyes v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 
No. 09cv1366 DMS (WMC), 2009 WL 3738177 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009); Curio v. Wachovia 
Mortg. Corp., No. 09-CV-1498-IEG (NLS), 2009 WL 3320499 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009); 
Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  All of 
these cases stem from litigation brought either by homeowners pursuant to HAMP or by 
homeowners using HAMP as a defense to foreclosure. 
14 See cases cited supra note 13 (providing numerous cases in which plaintiffs filed suit 
under HAMP). 
15 See, e.g., Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1 (alleging “breach of contract . . . , breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . , promissory estoppel as an alternative 
theory to recovery . . . , and violation of Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act”).  Durmic 
was based on a motion to dismiss.  Id. at *8.  Plaintiffs’ claims arise from having 
participated in the HAMP program, passing the Net Present Value test, submitting 
financial information, and having made all the required payments (except one party who 
was short by a payment) for the three month Trial Period Plan.  Id. at *2.  See also Benito, 
2010 WL 2130648, at *1 (asserting “claims for declaratory relief under RESPA and TILA and 
unfair lending practices under Nevada law . . . , injunctive relief . . . , breach of contract . . . , 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . , wrongful foreclosure . . . , 
inspection and accounting . . . , slander of title . . . , unfair lending . . . , and deceptive trade 
practices”); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *1 (alleging “(1) breach of written contract; (2) 
declaratory relief; (3) violation of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(‘RFDCPA’), Cal Civ. Code §1788, et. seq.; (4) invasion of privacy; and (5) unfair business 
practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code [sic] § 17200”).  This case was based on a 
motion to dismiss.  Id.  Escobedo came before the court based on the Plaintiff’s claim that 
when he attempted to modify his loan, he was wrongfully denied a modification.  Id. 
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two issues that are raised when plaintiffs bring affirmative suits in both 
non-judicial foreclosure states (states where foreclosures are not heard 
by judges) and judicial foreclosure states.16  First, does a borrower have 
standing as a third party beneficiary of HAMP to assert a claim based on 
mortgage servicers’ alleged violations of HAMP?17  Second, can a 
borrower sue under traditional contract law, the law of implied contracts 
or promissory estoppel, when the borrower participated in the Trial 
Period Plan (“TPP”) of HAMP and followed the requirements of TPP but 
was nevertheless denied a loan modification?18 
                                                 
16 See generally Rebekah Cook-Mack & Sarah Parady, Enforcing the Home Affordable 
Modification Program Through the Courts, 44 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 371 (2010) (providing a 
general overview of HAMP litigation and strategies that have been attempted based on the 
foreclosure procedures of the state).  Some states require judicial hearings and in those 
states judges “have shown a willingness to take noncompliance seriously and to apply 
commonsense.”  Id. at 372.  South Carolina and Connecticut have actually created HAMP 
specific laws through the judiciaries or the legislature in reference to foreclosures.  Id. at 
372.  Some other states require preforeclosure mediation between homeowners and service 
providers.  Id. at 373–74.  Lastly, the author explains a need for an affirmative suit in 
nonjudicial foreclosure states.  Id. at 373, 378. 
17 See In re Bank of Am., No. 10 md 02193 RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (D. Mass. July 6, 
2011) (stating that there is no third party standing stemming from HAMP); Lucia, 798 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1070–71 (citing to several Ninth Circuit decisions and determining that the 
“Servicer Participation Agreement” does not provide third party beneficiary standing); 
Phipps, 2011 WL 302803, at *8 (dismissing Plaintiff’s standing as a third party beneficiary 
stating, “[t]he complaint lacks facts to support a third-party beneficiary theory of relief”); 
Zoher, 2010 WL 4064798, at *4–5 (dismissing an attempt by the Plaintiffs to enforce HAMP 
compliance as a third party beneficiary); Hammonds, 2010 WL 3859069, at *3 (indicating that 
HAMP does not create a third party beneficiary standing); Hart, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 748 
(quoting Aleem v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. EDCV 09-01812-VAP (RZx), 2010 WL 532330, at 
*4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010)) (“There is no express or implied right to sue fund 
recipients . . . under TARP or HAMP.”); Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *7 (stating that a 
party could bring suit as a third party beneficiary, but that the plaintiffs at hand needed to 
amend their claim to specifically show details about their modification situation); Hoffman, 
2010 WL 2635773, at *2–5 (denying third party standing); Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *3–5 
(denying Plaintiff’s standing as a third party beneficiary); Benito, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7 
(denying third party standing, stating that government contracts are “assumed to be 
incidental beneficiaries” and Plaintiffs did not display any intent within the HAMP 
contract); Villa, 2010 WL 935680, at *2–3 (citing Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3) 
(determining that there is a lack of third party standing); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2–3 
(dismissing the claim of breach of contract based on third party beneficiary, stating 
“[q]ualified borrowers are incidental beneficiaries of the Agreement and do not have 
enforceable rights under the contract”); Reyes, 2009 WL 3738177, at *2 (“Plaintiff has alleged 
sufficient facts to support his third party beneficiary theory.”). 
18 Compare Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *3–4 (finding that TPP did not create a new 
contract due to lack of consideration and contractual language indicating a guaranteed 
modification), Grill, 2011 WL 127891, at *3–4 (finding that a meeting of the minds was 
insufficient, and there was no affirmative contractual language), and Vida, 2010 WL 
5148473, at *5 (finding TPP argument unpersuasive, as the claim stems from HAMP 
regulations and therefore is not a separate agreement), with Wigod, 673 F.3d at 585–86 
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The introduction to this Note illustrated a situation which could give 
rise to HAMP-specific litigation.  Part II of this Note describes the 
economic atmosphere which led to the creation of HAMP.19  Next, Part 
III discusses and analyzes the likelihood of success for motions brought 
under third party beneficiary standing stemming from an agreement 
between mortgage servicers and the federal government.  It also 
addresses a right of action arising from TPP agreements under 
traditional principals of contract law.20  Finally, Part IV evaluates the 
likelihood for success of the TPP contract theory and third party 
beneficiary theory, recommending changes for HAMP or other future 
loan modification programs in order to balance the need for private 
action and the risk of excessive litigation.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
September 2008, in the midst of the U.S. financial crisis, Congress 
enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.22  The Act provided 
                                                                                                             
(finding that traditional contract law in relation to the TPP was an appropriate claim), In re 
Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (stating that there was sufficient consideration and 
condition precedent under TPP agreements to satisfy standing), Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 
135–36 (denying Saxon’s motion to dismiss despite the TPP agreement stemming from 
HAMP because the court found there to be sufficient evidence that the TPP agreement was 
supported by consideration and therefore a TPP agreement is considered to be a new 
contract), Fletcher, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 930–32 (finding that TPP does create standing for a 
breach of contract claim), Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at. 350–53 (stating that a TPP agreement 
between a lender and borrower is sufficient to create standing), and Durmic, 2010 WL 
4825632, at *2–4 (denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss regarding TPP agreements). 
19 See infra Part II (chronicling the economic atmosphere, reasons for the creation of 
HAMP, and a general understanding of third party beneficiary and breach of contract 
claims under TPP). 
20 See infra Part III (analyzing the use of third party beneficiary standing and creation of 
a new contract stemming from TPP). 
21 See infra Part IV (discussing the likelihood for success in gaining standing for 
borrowers without explicitly being given standing and a model clause to correct the 
problem). 
22 Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 132; Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 346; Williams v. Geithner, 
No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2009); see Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  See generally Harrell, supra note 1 (providing background 
for the 2008 housing crisis); Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Past 
Subprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/ 
business/12credit.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the economic environment in 2008); 
Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, With No End Yet in 
Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1221694316175 
49947.html (discussing the turmoil in the market and some of the actions that were being 
taken in an attempt to correct it).  The article went so far as to describe the economic 
turmoil as a disease, stating “[t]he U.S. financial system resembles a patient in intensive 
care.  The body is trying to fight off a disease that is spreading, and as it does so, the body 
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$700 billion to the U.S. Treasury to stabilize financial systems.23  As part 
of the Act, Congress enacted the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”) to aid in the prevention of foreclosures.24 
The Treasury Department, working with the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (“FHFA”), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“Fannie Mae”), took a portion of the $700 billion and 
developed the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”).25  
HAMP was unveiled on February 18, 2009, and is set to expire on 
December 31, 2013.26 
HAMP is not the only program designed by Congress to ameliorate 
“the housing crisis.”27  To address the issues of second lien mortgages, 
the unemployed, those whose loans are held, insured or guaranteed by 
government agencies, and others who do not quite qualify for HAMP, 
the government has created additional programs such as Home 
Affordable Unemployment Program (“UP”), Principal Reduction 
                                                                                                             
convulses, settles for a time and then convulses again.  The illness seems to be 
overwhelming the self-healing tendencies of markets.”  Id.  Cases that use the language of 
“financial crisis” or “economic crisis” have predominantly found in favor of homeowners, 
which may show an influence of political beliefs. 
23 Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *1; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (Supp. IV 2011) (stating that 
the intended purpose of the Act was to “restore liquidity and stability to the financial 
system of the United States”); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 132–33 (discussing the purpose of 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act); Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 
2d 1059, 1062–63 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining the origin of HAMP as an attempt to provide 
stability to the economy); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 346–47 (providing a history of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and the subsequent Making Home Affordable 
program designed by the U.S. Treasury Department). 
24 See 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (Supp. IV 2011); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 132 (citing 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5201, 5211–5241 (2008)); Lucia, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a) (2008)); 
Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 346; Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *1 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211, 
5225 (2008)). 
25 See Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *2; Richard E. Gottlieb & Brett J. Natarelli, Update on 
Loan Modification Litigation, 66 BUS. LAW. 539, 540 n.9 (2011) (discussing the Treasury’s 
announcement of HAMP); Homeowner Frequently Asked Questions, MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/faqs/homeowner-faqs/Pages/ 
default.aspx. (last visited Aug. 3, 2012). 
26 See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 194.  HAMP was officially signed into law by 
President Obama on March 4, 2009.  Id.  See also Tim Massad, Expanding Our Efforts to Help 
More Homeowners and Strengthen Hard-Hit Communities, U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT (Jan. 
27, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Expanding-our-efforts-to-help-
more-homeowners-and-strengthen-hard-hit-communities.aspx (announcing the extension 
of HAMP to December 31, 2013); sources cited supra note 25 (providing the unveiling date 
of HAMP and its original expiration date). 
27 See generally MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE:  OVERVIEW OF 
PROGRAMS (Feb. 2011), http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/faqs/homeowner-
faqs/Documents/MHA_Presentation_Eng_211.pdf (providing an overview of the wide 
array of programs available to homeowners who are having trouble with their mortgages). 
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Alternative (“PRA”), Second Lien Modification Program (“2MP”), Home 
Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (“HAFA”), an alternate version of 
HAMP, Federal Housing Administration (“FHA-HAMP”), and Housing 
Finance Agency Innovation Fund for the Hardest Hit Housing Markets 
(“HHF”).28 
The HAMP program was designed to aid three to four million 
homeowners who had defaulted on their mortgages, or who were at 
imminent risk of defaulting, by modifying the interest of monthly 
payments to a more “affordable” rate.29  The premise of HAMP was that 
lenders would be provided financial incentives to adjust this target 
group’s mortgages.30  The Treasury Department provided mortgage 
servicers with a definition of borrowers eligible for the modification 
program, as well as specific modification protocols.31 
                                                 
28 See id. (providing an overview of the many programs which have been designed by 
the U.S. Treasury Department to combat home foreclosures using TARP money). 
29 See Belyea v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP, No. 10-10931-DJC, 2011 WL 2884964, at *2 (D. 
Mass. July 15, 2011); Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-10380-RGS, 2010 
WL 4825632, at *1 n.2 (D. Mass. Nov. 24, 2010); Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *2; Braucher, 
supra note 2, at 727; Gottlieb & Natarelli, supra note 25, at 541; infra notes 43–45 and 
accompanying text (providing the criteria for HAMP eligibility).  See generally Stephanie 
Armour, 2008 Foreclosure Filings Set Record, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-01-14-foreclosure-record-
filings_N.htm (discussing foreclosure rates in 2008); Les Christie, Foreclosures Up a Record 
81% in 2008:  Filings Continued to Soar Through the End of the Year and There’s No Relief in 
Sight for 2009, CNNMONEY, Jan. 15, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/ 
real_estate/millions_in_foreclosure/index.htm (providing foreclosure rates for 2008); 
Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in 
December, REALTYTRAC, Jan. 12, 2011, http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/ 
record-29-million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-
in-december-6309 (displaying a continued struggle in the U.S. housing market).  But cf. 
Marc. T. Smith & Ruth L. Steiner, Affordable Housing as an Adequate Public Facility, 36 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 443 (2002), available at http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol36/iss2/5 (discussing a 
need for the creation of additional affordable housing, which was a concern prior to the 
housing crisis and before the Government’s focus turned to keeping keep people in their 
homes). 
30 Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *2; see In re Bank of Am., No. 10 md 02193 RWZ, 2011 
WL 2637222, at *1 (D. Mass. July 6, 2011) (discussing money received by Bank of America 
as a part of HAMP); see also Massad, supra note 26 (providing for increased incentives to 
participating mortgage servicers).  Servicers can earn up to triple the incentives based on 
modifications which will include principal reduction.  Id.  But see Thompson, supra note 9, 
at 827–29 (arguing that the “incentives” HAMP uses to entice servicers for modification are 
not effective and, even when profitable, servicers often believe foreclosure to be of more 
value). 
31 Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *2; see Home Affordable Modification Program, MAKING 
HOME AFFORDABLE (FREDDIE MAC), Mar. 2012, at 1, http://www.freddiemac.com/service/ 
factsheets/pdf/mha_modification.pdf (providing a general overview of HAMP and its 
criteria); see infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (detailing the criteria necessary to 
qualify for HAMP modification). 
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On February 9, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice reached a 
twenty-five billion dollar agreement with five of the largest mortgage 
servicers (Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and 
Wells Fargo) pertaining to mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure 
abuses.32  The settlement provides for new servicing standards related to 
foreclosures and bankruptcy, which will be enforced by North Carolina 
Banking Commissioner Joseph A. Smith, who will be serving as monitor 
of the consent judgment.33  This settlement will relate specifically to 
HAMP, providing homeowners formerly denied a modification with an 
opportunity to reapply and requiring quicker turn around in response 
time.34  However, the settlement does not prevent individual borrowers 
from bringing their own lawsuits.35 
                                                 
32 See Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five 
Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-
186.html.  See generally Philip A. Lehman, Executive Summary of Multistate/Federal Settlement 
of Foreclosure Misconduct Claims, (NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT) 
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/NMS_Executive_Summary-7-23-2012.pdf (providing 
a history of the settlement negotiations); Federal Government & Attorneys General Reach 
Landmark Settlement with Major Banks, NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, 
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2012) (providing an 
overview of the $25 billion dollar settlement as well as links to additional information); 
Mortgage Servicing Settlement, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/mortgageservicingsettlement (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2012) (providing an overview of the settlement as well as links to additional 
information).  The settlement includes payments of twenty billion dollars for relief to 
borrowers including principal reduction, refinancing, and other forms of relief.  Fact Sheet:  
Mortgage Servicing Settlement, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/mortgageservicingsettlement/fact-sheet 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Fact Sheet: Mortgage Servicing Settlement] (providing a 
general overview of financial relief committed to homeowners).  The settlement will also 
provide for payments to the state and federal governments in the sum of five billion dollars 
in order to provide for payments to borrowers who have already been foreclosed upon 
between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2011, and to pay for public funds lost due to 
servicer misconduct.  Id. 
33 See generally SERVICING STANDARDS HIGHLIGHTS, http://www.atg.wa.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mortgage_Settlement/Servicing
%20Standards%20Highlights.pdf (explaining the new requirements of mortgage servicers 
in interacting with homeowners and the handling of mortgages); Ben Hallman, Mortgage 
Settlement Promises Reform of Banks’ Bad Behavior, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 9, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/mortgage-settlement-bank-reform_n_ 
1266428.html (evaluating and explaining elements of the new settlement including the role 
of Joseph A. Smith, North Carolina banking commissioner and the appointed “monitor” of 
the settlement); Fact Sheet:  Mortgage Servicing Settlement, supra note 32 (providing an 
overview of new standards and enforcement). 
34 SERVICING STANDARDS HIGHLIGHTS, Section II, http://www.atg.wa.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mortgage_Settlement/Servicing
StandardsHighlights.pdf.  Compare Paul Kiel, Will Mortgage Settlement Avoid Repeating 
Obama’s Foreclosure Failures?, PROPUBLICA, Feb. 10, 2012, http://www.propublica.org/ 
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A. HAMP Eligibility Requirements 
Before addressing HAMP eligibility requirements, it is important to 
understand the foreclosure positions of the numerous parties involved in 
mortgages and how they interact.36  Mortgage lenders in the years 
leading up to the housing crisis, and today, have tended to originate a 
loan with the intention of selling it to investors.37  The majority of these 
loans have been purchased and pooled together in trusts.38  Expected 
income streams from these trusts have been used to form bonds, which 
are then sold to hundreds or thousands of investors.39  Bonds are often 
                                                                                                             
article/will-mortgage-settlement-learn-from-obamas-foreclosure-failures (discussing how 
the new settlement, unlike HAMP, will have more bite and enforcement with a “Monitor” 
to impose penalties), with Hallman, supra note 33 (quoting several sources that have 
displayed skepticism as to the effectiveness of the settlement), and Too Many Unanswered 
Questions, and Too Little Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
02/12/opinion/sunday/the-foreclosure-deal-unanswered-questions-and-little-relief.html 
(stating that the settlement will likely only reach two million former and current 
homeowners).  Joseph Sant, a foreclosure attorney at Staten Island Legal Services in New 
York, has explained that “[o]n paper [the settlement] looks like it will help people, . . . [b]ut 
we have a lot of programs that look good on paper that are failing because they aren’t 
being enforced.  As soon as A.G.s lower their guns, the mortgage servicers will go back to 
flaunting the rules.”  Hallman, supra note 33.  The 1.5 billion dollars designated for some 
750,000 borrowers, who were treated unfairly during foreclosures between 2008 and 2011, 
will receive a total of $2,000 as part of this settlement.  Too Many Unanswered Questions, and 
Too Little Relief, supra. 
35 See Fact Sheet:  Mortgage Servicing Settlement, supra note 32; see also Too Many 
Unanswered Questions, and Too Little Relief, supra note 34 (noting that the banks did not get 
the blanket release they had originally wanted in the settlement, but they were able to get 
protection from civil law suits brought by the state and federal government).  This Note 
will not be analyzing the settlement, because it does not materially affect the issues at hand.  
However, it is important to recognize the settlement, because it will be providing a second 
opportunity to many homeowners who were previously denied and could potentially lead 
to more litigation if standards are not properly followed. 
36 See infra notes 37–41 and accompanying text (illustrating the different players 
involved in mortgages).  See generally 355: The Giant Pool of Money, THIS AM. LIFE, 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/355/transcript (last visited Jan. 
22, 2012) (providing a narrative of several players involved with mortgage securities 
during boom time and outlining their responsibilities). 
37 See Thompson, supra note 9, at 763; see also THE GA. SUPERIOR CT. CLERKS’ 
COOPERATIVE AUTH., INDEXING PARTIES FROM SECURITIZATION AND MORTGAGE-BACKED 
CERTIFICATES INTO LAND RECORD INDEXES IN THE ST. OF GA. 3 (July 23, 2008) [hereinafter 
Indexing], http://www.gsccca.org/filesandforms/files/guidelines/Indexing_ 
Securitization_Trust_Instruments.pdf (explaining a lender as those who “originate 
mortgages with property owners”); FREDDIE MAC, YOUR STEP-BY-STEP MORTGAGE GUIDE:  
FROM APPLICATION TO CLOSING 4, http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/docs/ 
Step_by_Step_Mortgage_Guide_English.pdf (defining mortgage lenders and servicers). 
38 See Thompson, supra note 9, at 763; Indexing, supra note 37, at 2–4.. 
39 See sources cited supra note 38 (providing an explanation of the parties involved with 
the mortgage process and specifically explaining the securitization of home mortgages into 
bonds). 
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broken into four different categories:  “interest payments, principal 
payments, late payments, and prepayment penalties.”40  Finally, there 
are servicers who stand in for the trusts, or persons legally holding the 
mortgages, handling the day-to-day involvement with homeowners, 
such as billing, collections, and receiving distress petitions from 
homeowners.41 
• The class of loans eligible for HAMP modification is 
described in Williams v. Geithner.42  Eligible loans 
must meet the following criteria: 
• The loan is a first-lien mortgage originated on or 
before January 1, 2009;43 
• The loan is secured by a one-to-four unit property, 
one unit of which is the borrower’s principal 
residence; 
• The property has not been abandoned or 
condemned; 
• The current unpaid principal balance is no greater 
than specified limits ($729,750 for a one-unit 
property) 
• The loan is delinquent or default is reasonably 
foreseeable; 
• The borrower has a monthly mortgage payment 
[including principal, interest, taxes, insurance, and 
when applicable, association fees, and existing 
escrow shortages] greater than 31 percent of 
monthly income, and has insufficient assets to make 
the payment; and 
                                                 
40 Thompson, supra note 9, at 763. 
41 Id. at 765; see Indexing, supra note 37, at 5 (defining servicers); FREDDIE MAC, YOUR 
STEP-BY-STEP MORTGAGE GUIDE:  FROM APPLICATION TO CLOSING 4, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/docs/Step_by_Step_Mortgage_Guide_English
.pdf (defining mortgage lenders and servicers). 
42 Williams v. Geithner, No. 09–1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 
9, 2009). 
43 Recognizing a need for providing second lien homeowners with modifications, Fannie 
Mae announced the creation of the 2MP program.  See generally Home Affordable Modification 
Program:  Introduction of Second Lien Modification Program, FANNIE MAE, Sept. 21, 2010, 
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/svc1014.pdf (discussing 
how HAMP and the 2MP program could be used to benefit homeowners with second lien 
mortgages).  Cf. Jonathan R. Sichtermann, Slowing the PACE of Recovery:  Why Property 
Assessed Clean Energy Programs Risk Repeating the Mistakes of the Recent Foreclosure Crisis, 46 
VAL. U. L. REV. 263 (2011) (illustrating the importance of lien order for lenders and the risks 
associated with junior or secondary liens). 
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• The borrower documents a financial hardship.44 
On January 27, 2012, the U.S. Treasury expanded the scope of HAMP to 
include not just principal residences, but also currently occupied rental 
properties or vacant properties which the owner intends to rent.45 
The Treasury guidelines, as quoted in Williams, require 
“participating servicers . . . to consider all eligible mortgage loans unless 
prohibited by the rules of the applicable [pooling and servicing 
agreement] and/or other investor servicing agreements.”46  Properties 
meeting the criteria stated above are then valued using the net present 
value (“NPV”) test.47  If the modification would raise NPV, then the 
borrower must be offered a Trial Period Plan, that is, an opportunity to 
obtain a loan modification.48  If the modification does not raise NPV, 
                                                 
44 Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *2; see Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 195; Home 
Affordable Modification Program, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE (FREDDIE MAC), Mar. 2012, at 1, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/service/factsheets/pdf/mha_modification.pdf (providing 
program eligibility as of June 30, 2011).  See generally MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE 
PROGRAM: HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES V 2.0 (Sept. 22, 
2010) [hereinafter Handbook 2.0], https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/ 
hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_20.pdf (providing the lending criteria at the time of the 
Williams case). 
45 Massad, supra note 26 (providing for an expansion of those parties eligible for HAMP 
including owners of rental properties). 
46 Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *2. 
47 See Stagikas v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (D. Mass. 2011); 
Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347 (D. Mass. 2011); Vida v. 
OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *6 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2010); 
Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-10380-RGS, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1 (D. 
Mass. Nov. 24, 2010); Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *3; Gottlieb & Natarelli, supra note 25, 
at 542; see also Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 196 (explaining the Net Present Value test 
necessary to determine if a modification would be economically beneficial).  See generally 
Home Affordable Modification Program Base Net Present Value (NPV) Model Specifications, 
(MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE), June 11, 2009 https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/ 
programs/docs/hamp_servicer/npvoverview.pdf (providing a simplified five page 
explanation of the NPV test); MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, HOME AFFORDABLE 
MODIFICATION PROGRAM:  BASE NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) MODEL V4.03 MODEL 
DOCUMENTATION (Sept. 1, 2011), https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/ 
hamp_servicer/npvmodeldocumentationv403.pdf (providing a detailed explanation of the 
NPV).  Net Present Value is defined as “[t]he present value of net cash flow from a project, 
discounted by the cost of capital.  This value is used to evaluate the project’s investment 
potential.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (9th ed. 2009). 
48 See Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *6; Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *3; cf. Stagikas, 795 F. 
Supp. 2d at 133 (stating that if the homeowner qualifies then the servicer may provide a 
TPP agreement); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 347 (stating that if the homeowner is qualified 
then the servicer should provide a TPP). 
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then the applicant does not have to be offered this opportunity.49  If the 
eligible borrower remains current throughout the trial period, the 
servicer is required to provide a loan modification.50  However, even if 
the borrower for some reason is not able to complete the TPP, the 
servicer is required to consider the borrower for “all other available loss 
mitigation options.”51 
As part of HAMP, the Treasury, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac have 
attempted to implement remedies and offer education for potential 
HAMP borrowers.52  Even before the NPV determination, HAMP 
requires mortgage servicers to explain the procedures for applying for a 
loan modification and provide information on financial counseling.53  
Inquiries and complaints are to be “provided fair consideration, and 
timely and appropriate responses and resolution.”54  A federal hotline 
was established to advise borrowers and to direct complaints to the 
servicer’s senior level management.55  If the problem is unresolved, the 
counselor can transfer the case to a designated team at Fannie Mae, 
whose chief responsibility is to resolve individual and systemic 
problems.56  To ensure further compliance by servicers, Freddie Mac is 
                                                 
49 See Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 133; Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *6; Durmic v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-10380-RGS, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1 n.3 (D. Mass. 
Nov. 24, 2010); Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *3; Gottlieb & Natarelli, supra note 25, at 542. 
50 See In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *1 (D. Mass. July 6, 
2011); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 133; Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 348; Williams, 2009 WL 
3757380, at *3.  But see Rackley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-387-XR, 2011 
WL 2971357, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2011) (finding that no contract existed, and 
therefore the borrower is not entitled to a loan modification); Grill v. BAC Home Loans 
Servicing LP, No. 10-CV-03057-FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 127891, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011) 
(stating that there was a failure to show the existence of a contract and therefore the 
servicer was not required to provide a modification); Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-
987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (finding the TPP argument 
unpersuasive because the claim stems from HAMP regulations and therefore is not a 
separate agreement). 
51 Handbook 3.4, supra note 9, at 92. 
52 See Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *3. 
53 See Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide, BULL. (Freddie Mac), June 30, 2011, at 2, available 
at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll1111.pdf (discussing 
escalated cases and the necessary processes and procedures to address complaints of 
borrowers).  But see HAMP Changes Urgently Needed, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CENTER, Sept. 
2010, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/loan_mod/hamp_policy_ 
brief.pdf (discussing the lack of accountability and transparency in HAMP, especially 
pertaining to the NPV). 
54 Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *3. 
55 See Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *3; see also Handbook 3.4, supra note 9, at 43–44 
(discussing escalated cases and the necessary processes and procedures to address 
complaints of borrowers). 
56 Compare Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *3, with HAMP Changes Urgently Needed, NAT’L 
CONSUMER L. CENTER, Sept. 2010, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_ 
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charged with auditing a sample of loan modification applications that 
have been denied in order to minimize overlooked or inadvertently 
denied applications.57  Lastly, servicers are required to provide the U.S. 
Treasury and Fannie Mae with specific reasons for denial through a 
coded system.58  However, the Servicer Handbook hardly mentions the 
ramifications to servicers for failure to comply.59 
Lawsuits pertaining to HAMP generally involve issues arising out of 
the requirements necessary for HAMP modifications.60  The complaint or 
defense made by homeowners is that mortgage servicers do not follow 
the program’s guidelines by pre-emptively initiating foreclosure 
proceedings and/or wrongfully denying petitions for modification.61  
But homeowners can have no legal recourse against lenders unless the 
courts recognize the homeowners’ right to bring suit.62  The following 
                                                                                                             
mortgage/loan_mod/hamp_policy_brief.pdf  (describing the HAMP escalations center, the 
group tasked with resolving disputes, as “seldom offer[ing] beleaguered homeowners 
relief, usually offering homeowners nothing more than a restatement of the servicer’s 
unsupported assertions”), and Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to 
Foreclosure:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affairs, 111th Cong. 6 
(2010) (written testimony of Diane E. Thompson, National Consumer Law Center), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/testimony-
senate-banking.pdf (suggesting that there is a lack of “quality mediation programs” and 
“legal services” supporting homeowners in trouble). 
57 See sources cited supra note 56 (discussing the ideal process for HAMP and 
documenting the lack of enforcement by the government pertaining to HAMP); see also 
Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988, at *6 (D. Ariz. 
June 22, 2010) (discussing Freddie Mac’s charge to assure compliance through “evaluation 
of documented evidence to confirm adherence”) (internal quotations omitted); Chiles & 
Mitchell, supra note 9, at 197 (defining Freddie Mac as the “sole compliance agent”). 
58 See Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *3.  See generally MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE (MHA) 
SERVICER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 8–20 (Feb. 2011), https://www.hmpadmin.com/ 
portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/servicerreportingrequirements.pdf (providing 
servicer reporting requirements).  Specific data set reporting requirements provide several 
scenarios in which servicers must provide a reason for denying a modification.  Id. at 30. 
59 See generally Handbook 3.4, supra note 9 (making little reference to the penalties for a 
lack of compliance and at best requiring the servicer to take a first step towards resolution 
in cases of escalation); COMMITMENT TO PURCHASE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT AND SERVICER 
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp 
_servicer/servicerparticipationagreement.pdf [hereinafter SPA Agreement] (providing 
Freddie Mac the ability to reduce payments, require additional oversight, terminate the 
Service Participation Agreement, or gather additional information, but there is no mention 
of being able to force a modification). 
60 See supra note 11 (illustrating several examples of borrowers’ experiences with 
HAMP). 
61 See sources cited supra note 13 (demonstrating litigation brought by homeowners and 
mortgage servicers’ attempts to have the case dismissed). 
62 See Rackley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-387-XR, 2011 WL 2971357, 
at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2011); Bourdelais v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. 3:10CV670-HEH, 2011 
WL 1306311, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2011); Grill v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 10-
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sections will provide background information on this problem, 
discussing the two principal methods used by homeowners to bring 
affirmative suits in non-judicial based foreclosure states.63 
B. Third Party Beneficiary Rights Under HAMP and Servicer Participation 
Agreements 
Third party beneficiary issues are pertinent to HAMP litigation 
because the borrowers facing foreclosure were not original parties to the 
Servicer Participation Agreement (“SPA”) between a mortgage servicer 
and agents of the federal government—Fannie Mae signs agreements as 
an agent of the government and Freddie Mac is charged with compliance 
enforcement in the SPA.64 
                                                                                                             
CV-03057-FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 127891, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011); Vida v. OneWest 
Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *6–7 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2010); Zoher v. 
Chase Home Fin., No. 10-14135-CIV, 2010 WL 4064798, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2010) (citing 
Hoffman v. Bank of Am., No. C 10-2171, 2010 WL 2635773, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2010)); Hoffman, 
2010 WL 2635773, at *4–5; Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010); Villa v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10CV81 DMS (WVG), 2010 WL 935680, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 
2010); Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 BTM (BLM), 2009 WL 
4981618 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009) (cases dismissing claims brought by homeowners based on 
HAMP and occasionally causing foreclosure to move forward). 
63 See infra Part II.B–C (discussing the background of third party beneficiary and the use 
of TPP in creating a new contract to provide standing for homeowners). 
64 See In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (D. Mass. July 6, 
2011) (stating that there is no third party standing stemming from HAMP); Lucia v. Wells 
Fargo Bank N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1070–71 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing to several Ninth 
Circuit decisions, the court determined that the “Servicer Participation Agreement” does 
not provide third party beneficiary standing); Phipps v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV F 
10-2025 LJO SKO, 2011 WL 302803, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (dismissing Plaintiff’s 
standing as a third party beneficiary stating, “[t]he complaint lacks facts to support a third-
party beneficiary theory of relief”); Hart v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 
741, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Aleem v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. EDCV 09-01812-VAP 
(RZx), 2010 WL 532330, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010)) (“There is no express or implied right 
to sue fund recipients . . .  under TARP or HAMP.”) (internal quotation omitted); Sampson 
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. CV 10-08836 DDP (SSx), 2010 WL 5397236 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 19, 2010) (finding for third party beneficiary standing); Zoher, 2010 WL 4064798, at *4–
5 (dismissing an attempt by the plaintiffs to enforce HAMP compliance as a third party 
beneficiary); Hammonds v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, No. EDCV 10-1025 AG (OPx), 2010 
WL 3859069, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010) (indicating that HAMP does not create a third 
party beneficiary standing); Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Inc., No. 09-cv-1985-
L(RBB), 2010 WL 3212131, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (stating that a party could bring 
suit as third party beneficiary, but that the plaintiff at hand needed to amend his claim to 
specifically show details about his modification situation); Hoffman, 2010 WL 2635773, at 
*2–5 (denying third party standing); Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *2–5 (denying Plaintiff’s 
standing as a third party beneficiary); Benito v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., No. 2:09-CV-
001218-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7 (D. Nev. May 21, 2010) (denying third party 
standing, stating that government contracts are “assumed to be incidental beneficiaries” 
and the plaintiffs did not display any intent within the HAMP contract) (internal 
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When dealing with third party beneficiary issues, it is important to 
keep in mind the fundamental distinction, as stated by the Supreme 
Court, between “an intention to benefit a third party and an intention 
that the third party should have the right to enforce[ment]. . . .”65  Often, 
to avoid any question, private parties will be sure to use express 
language, placing a clause in the contract naming “third party 
beneficiaries.”66  The situation is less clear in the case of government 
contracts.67 
In every issue there are two ends of the spectrum which are often 
quite polarized, and government contracts concerning third party 
beneficiaries are no different.68  At one end of the spectrum is the 
argument that all citizens should be third party beneficiaries, because 
government is representative of the people and is supposed to act on 
behalf of the people.69  Thus, the government implicitly intends that each 
citizen benefit from that contract.70  On the opposite side of the spectrum, 
                                                                                                             
quotations omitted); Villa, 2010 WL 935680, at *3 (citing Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2–3) 
(determining that there was a lack of third party standing); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at 
*2–3 (dismissed the claim of breach of contract based on third party beneficiary, stating 
“[q]ualified borrowers are incidental beneficiaries of the Agreement and do not have 
enforceable rights under the contract”); Reyes v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 09cv1366 
DMS (WMC), 2009 WL 3738177, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) (“Plaintiff has alleged 
sufficient facts to support his third party beneficiary theory.”); Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 
9, at 197 (defining Freddie Mac as the “sole compliance agent responsible for enforcing 
HAMP” and discussing the potential details of its enforcement). 
65 Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1348 (2011) (quoting J. MURRAY, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 45.6, at. 92 (rev. ed. 2007)); see also In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 
2637222, at *3 (discussing whether the government intended to provide a benefit to the 
plaintiff). 
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981). 
67 Id. § 313. 
68 See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the two extremes that can be 
argued involving government contracts and third party beneficiaries). 
69 See Robert S. Adelson, Note, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied Right of Action Analysis:  
The Fiction of One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875, 878–79 (1985) (discussing a need for 
a restrictive test on third party beneficiary because “every member of the public is in some 
sense an intended beneficiary of a government contract”).  Contra Klamath Water Users 
Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing a contract 
between the United States and a dam operator and asserting that even though the contract 
was entered into with irrigators in mind, they were not beneficiaries of that contract).  The 
court stated, “[t]o allow them intended third-party beneficiary status would open the door 
to all users receiving a benefit from the Project achieving similar status, a result not 
intended by the Contract.”  Id. at 1212; Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *4 (citing Klamath, 204 
F.3d at 1211–12); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2 (citing to Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1211); 
Patience A. Crowder, More Than Merely Incidental:  Third-Party Beneficiary Rights in Urban 
Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 297–98 (2010) (discussing the 
fear of mass litigation and some of the changes in perception amongst the courts). 
70 See supra note 69 (discussing how government’s function can be interpreted to benefit 
all citizens).  
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it is argued that government contracts must expressly identify who will 
own the right to enforce the contract as a third party beneficiary.71  It is 
the gray area between these extremes where HAMP litigation originates, 
creating a difficult decision for courts who struggle to determine whom 
the government intended to benefit or who they simply believed would 
incidentally benefit.72 
Third party beneficiary status is a relatively new concept in contract 
theory and is still debated by legal scholars.73  In the case of government 
contracts the substantive law pertaining to third parties is governed by 
                                                 
71 See Adelson, supra note 69, at 881 (“Often, courts expend considerable energy 
determining that a private action cannot be implied from a statute and then with little 
consideration brush aside the contractual issue, as if its failure follows a fortiori from the 
failure of the statutory claim.”). 
72 See In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (D. Mass. July 6, 
2011) (stating that there is no third party standing stemming from HAMP); Lucia v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1070–71 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing to several Ninth 
Circuit decisions, the court determined that the “Servicer Participation Agreement” does 
not provide third party beneficiary standing); Phipps v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV F 
10-2025 LJO SKO, 2011 WL 302803, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (dismissing Plaintiff’s 
claim as a third party beneficiary stating, “[t]he complaint lacks facts to support a third-
party beneficiary theory of relief”); Zoher v. Chase Home Fin., No. 10-14135-CIV, 2010 WL 
4064798, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2011) (dismissing an attempt by the plaintiffs to enforce 
HAMP compliance as a third party beneficiary); Hammonds v. Aurora Loans Servs. LLC, 
No. EDCV 10-1025 AG (OPx), 2010 WL 3859069, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010) (indicating 
that HAMP does not create a third party beneficiary standing); Hart v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Aleem v. Bank of Am., 
N.A., No. EDCV 09-01812-VAP (RZx), 2010 WL 532330 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010)) (“There is 
no express or implied right to sue fund recipients . . . under TARP or HAMP.”); Marques v. 
Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 09-cv-1985-L(RBB), 2010 WL 3212131, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 
Aug. 12, 2010) (stating that a party could bring a suit as third party beneficiary, but the 
Plaintiff at hand needed to amend his claim to specifically show details about his 
modification situation); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010 WL 2635773, 
at *2–5 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010) (denying third party standing); Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at 
*3–5 (denying Plaintiff’s standing as a third party beneficiary); Benito v. Indymac Mortg. 
Servs., No. 2:09-CV-001218-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7 (D. Nev. May 21, 2010) 
(denying third party standing, stating that persons who are not parties to a government 
contract are “assumed to be incidental beneficiaries” and Plaintiffs did not display any 
intent within the HAMP contract); Villa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10CV81 DMS 
(WVG), 2010 WL 935680, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010) (citing Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at 
*2–3) (determining that there is a lack of third party standing); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, 
at *2–3 (dismissing the breach of contract claim based on third party beneficiary, stating 
“[q]ualified borrowers are incidental beneficiaries of the Agreement and do not have 
enforceable rights under the contract”); Reyes v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., No. 09cv1366 DMS 
(WMC), 2009 WL 3738177, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) (“Plaintiff has alleged sufficient 
facts to support his third party beneficiary theory.”). 
73 See generally Crowder, supra note 69 (providing a general background of the 
development of third party beneficiaries from common law through the modern approach). 
Jacobs: Help or Hamp(er)?—The Courts' Reluctance to Provide the Right to
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
284 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
federal law.74  In order for a third party to be deemed a third party 
beneficiary, that party must establish that he or she is an intended 
beneficiary of the contract in question, not just an incidental beneficiary 
of it.75  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts describes the difference 
between intended and incidental beneficiaries: 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and 
promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended 
beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the 
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of 
the parties and either 
 
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an 
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the 
beneficiary; or 
 
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee 
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the 
promised performance. 
 
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not 
an intended beneficiary.76 
The Restatement, in making specific reference to third party 
beneficiaries and government contracts, states that, generally, a party 
who contracts with the government is not subject to liability to a member 
of the public.77  However, there are two exceptions:  (1) the contract 
specifically creates a liability, and (2) “the promisee is subject to liability 
                                                 
74 See Hammonds, 2010 WL 3859069, at *2; Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *3 (citing Cnty. 
of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2009)); Benito, 2010 WL 
2130648, at *7 (quoting Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1210); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2 (citing 
Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1210); Ronald G. Morgan, Foreign Military Sales Cash Procurements:  
Additional Liability Considerations, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 617, 625–26 (1996). 
75 Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1211 (“To sue as a third-party beneficiary of a contract, the third 
party must show that the contract reflects the express or implied intention of the parties to 
the contract to benefit the third party.”); see In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (citing 
Astra USA, 131 S.Ct. at 1347–48); Zoher, 2010 WL 4064798, at *4–5; Marques, 2010 WL 
3212131, at *3 (citing to Astra USA, 588 F.3d at 1244); Hoffman, 2010 WL 2635773, at *3; 
Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, *3 (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981)); 
Benito, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7; Villa, 2010 WL 935680, at *2; Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2 
(citing Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1211); Adelson, supra note 69, at 877–78; Lori A. Alvino, Note, 
Who’s Watching the Watchdogs?  Responding to the Erosion of Research Ethics by Enforcing 
Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 915 (2003). 
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). 
77 Id. § 313; Morgan, supra note 74, at 625–26. 
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to the member of the public for the damages and a direct action against 
the promisor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with the 
policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for 
its breach.”78 
The U.S. Supreme Court has gone further to differentiate between 
“intended beneficiaries” and “incidental beneficiaries” in regards to 
government contracts.79  “The distinction between an intention to benefit 
a third party and an intention that the third party should have the right 
to enforcement is emphasized where the promisee is a governmental 
entity.”80  Traditionally, parties that benefit from government contracts 
are assumed to be incidental beneficiaries, rather than intended 
beneficiaries.81  Mentioning a party within a contract is not enough by 
itself.82  The question then becomes under what circumstances, other 
than being stated expressly, can a party become an intended beneficiary 
for the purpose of legal action. 
When determining if someone is a third party beneficiary of a 
contract, the courts will occasionally look to the circumstances leading to 
the formation of the agreement.83  Even with the use of outside sources, it 
                                                 
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONTRACTS § 313 (1981). 
79 See Astra USA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1348 (quoting J. MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, 
§ 45.6, at 92 (rev. ed. 2007)) (addressing the issue of third party beneficiary). 
80 Id.; see In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (quoting Speleos v. BAC Home Loans 
Servicing, L.P., No. 10-cv-11503-NMG, 2010 WL 5174510 (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2010)). 
81 See In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *3; Hammonds v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 
No. EDCV 10-1025 AG (OPx), 2010 WL 3859069, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010) (citing 
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999)); 
Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 09-CV-1985-L(RBB), 2010 WL 3212131, at *3 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (citing Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1244 
(9th Cir. 2009)); Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 
2572988, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010); Benito v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., No. 2:09-CV-
001218-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7 (D. Nev. May 21, 2010) (citing Astra USA, 588 
F.3d at 1244); Villa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.10CV81 DMS (WVG), 2010 WL 935680, at 
* 2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010); Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 
BTM (BLM), 2009 WL 4981618, at *2 ( S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009) (quoting Klamath, 204 F.3d at 
1211); Gottlieb & Natarelli, supra note 25, at 544. 
82 See Hammonds, 2010 WL 3859069, at *3 (explaining that the difference between an 
intended beneficiary and an incidental one is determined by the reasonableness of one’s 
reliance on the promise); Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *4 (stating that beneficiaries do not 
need to be expressly named in the contract, but that it must be clear that the party falls 
within an intended class); Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *4 (displaying a need for precise 
language as compared to potentially vague language); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2 
(stating that an agreement was entered in part for the benefit of borrowers, but that the 
language of the contract was not sufficient to support them as third party beneficiaries); 
Gottlieb & Natarelli, supra note 25, at 544. 
83 Morgan, supra note 74, at 627–28.  See generally Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *4–7 
(explaining the history of HAMP’s creation to show the intention to have borrowers 
recognized as third party beneficiaries); Adelson, supra note 69 (discussing third party 
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can be difficult to fully comprehend the intentions of the contracting 
parties.84  It has been suggested that beneficiary rights pertaining to 
government contracts should be determined by weighing the impact that 
the creation of an “additional remedy” would have on the goals of the 
statute.85  Another suggested test is whether there is “justifiable reliance” 
by a beneficiary based upon commercial and social circumstances.86  The 
same author proposed that there may be an implied right of action for 
third party beneficiaries that can be determined by an examination of the 
scope and stated intentions of the administrative agency charged with 
implementing the legislation.87  There would appear to be some basis for 
such an argument, because the Supreme Court has used “administrative 
interpretation” in interpreting silent or ambiguous statutes.88  Lastly, it 
has been put forth that “a right of action is favored ‘when there is 
evidence that existing remedies are inadequate and that additional 
remedies would increase the likelihood of compliance and afford direct 
relief to a class which the legislature wished to protect.’”89  Many courts 
discussing HAMP and third party beneficiaries have tested standing on 
the basis of whether it would be reasonable for a party to expect to be a 
                                                                                                             
beneficiary and the use of statutes as well as congressional history by the courts to 
determine intent). 
84 See generally Adelson, supra note 69 (examining third party beneficiary and the use of 
statutes as well as congressional history by the courts to determine intent). 
85 See Alvino, supra note 75, at 917. 
86 Alvino, supra note 75, at 917.  This proposed method would be beneficial to 
homeowners attempting to enforce a loan modification because, while many courts have 
recognized the circumstances which have led borrowers to believe they are third party 
beneficiaries, they simply did not see enough evidence for a “clear intent.”  Id. 
87 See generally Adelson, supra note 69, at 875–76 (arguing that although the statutes 
provide power to administrative agencies, it is the agencies themselves who provide the 
wording and documentation for government contracts).  Therefore, it is really the agency’s 
intentions that the court should look to because it is the actual contracting body.  Id. 
88 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute. 
Id. 
89 Charles Tiefer, No More Nisour Squares:  Legal Control of Private Security Contractors in 
Iraq and After, 88 OR. L. REV. 745, 771 (2009). 
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beneficiary under the circumstances.90  No matter what method a court 
uses to interpret whether a third party beneficiary has standing, there is 
a nearly universal fear amongst courts and scholars that litigation will 
run rampant.91 
1. Major Cases Relating to HAMP and the Third Party Beneficiary 
In several cases, Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. is cited to 
explain the lack of “clear intent” needed for third party beneficiary 
                                                 
90 See Zoher v. Chase Home Fin., No. 10-14135-CIV, 2010 WL 4064798, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 15, 2010); Hammonds v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, No. EDCV 10-1025 AG (OPx), 2010 
WL 3859069, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 302); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010 WL 2635773, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
June 30, 2010); Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 
2572988, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010); see also Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. 
Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999) (providing the original criteria used by many 
courts to determine what is a reasonable expectation). 
91 See Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1211–12 (discussing a contract between the United States and 
a dam operator).  Even though the parties entered into the contract with irrigators in mind, 
they were not beneficiaries of that contract.  Id. at 1212.  The court stated that “to allow 
them intended third-party beneficiary status would open the door to all users receiving a 
benefit from the Project achieving similar status, a result not intended by the Contract.”  Id.  
See also Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *4 (quoting Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1212) (“[T]o allow them 
intended third-party beneficiary status would open the door to all users receiving a benefit 
from the Project achieving similar status, a result not intended by the contract.”); Escobedo 
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 DTM (BLM), 2009 WL 4981618, at *2 (S.D. 
Cal. Dec. 15, 2009) (quoting Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1212); Adelson, supra note 69, at  878–79 
(discussing a need for a restrictive test on third party beneficiary because “every member of 
the public is in some sense an intended beneficiary”).  Contra Toby J. Stern, Comment, 
Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377 (2003) 
(proposing that the use of a “Floodgates of Litigation” theory is unconstitutional in certain 
circumstances under Article III separation of powers and that the power to prevent mass 
litigation predominantly falls into the hands of Congress).  The author points to several 
flaws in the concept of “floodgates” but not all will be mentioned in this footnote.  Id.  First, 
he describes the floodgates as being an attractive method of limiting additions to already 
full dockets.  Id. at 386–88.  On the other hand, citing to Justice Posner, the author then 
discusses the potential problem of diluting the quality of judges by having clerks writing 
opinions.  Id. at 390–91.  The author again cites to Justice Posner, explaining that when the 
“floodgates” doctrine first appeared, judges would use this to prevent cases without 
knowledge as to its actual effects on the judicial system and often without ever looking at 
legislative intent.  Id. at 394–95.  Quoting Justice Tobriner in Dillion v. Legg, the author 
demonstrates that the mere existence of mass litigation shows a pressing need for legal 
redress.  Id. at 398.  As part of the separation of powers, the author points to courts not 
being able to impose new federal filing fees and argues that they “likewise may not control 
its own jurisdiction through aversion to a flood of litigation.”  Id. at 400.  Last, the author 
highlights “[t]he lifting of the ‘impact’ rule in rewarding damages for mental anguish,” 
asserting that this did not cause the judicial system to collapse.  Id. at 403. 
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standing.92  In Escobedo, the Plaintiff alleged that he was denied a 
modification and claimed to be a third party beneficiary of the Servicer 
Participation Agreement between Countrywide and Fannie Mae, 
arguing that he was therefore entitled to a cause of action.93  Because the 
agreement at issue stated that it “shall inure to the benefit of . . . the 
parties to the Agreement and their permitted successors-in-interest,” the court 
found that there was no clear intent to create a third party beneficiary.94  
Furthermore, the court found that since the Servicer Participation 
Agreement did not require Countrywide to modify eligible loans, there 
was no basis for the benefit.95  The court took the position that “[t]he 
Guidelines set forth eligibility requirements and state[d]:  ‘Participating 
servicers are required to consider all eligible loans under the program 
guidelines unless prohibited by the rules of the applicable PSA and/or 
other investor servicing agreements.’”96 
The key case supporting mortgage holders claiming third party 
beneficiary standing under HAMP is Marques v. Wells Fargo Home 
Mortgage, Inc.97  In this case, Ademar A. Marques’s loan was deemed 
eligible for modification, but his application was nonetheless denied by 
Wells Fargo and foreclosure proceedings commenced.98  The court 
examined the agreement between the federal government and mortgage 
servicers, finding that the agreement expressly provided that a servicer 
                                                 
92 See Zoher, 2010 WL 4064798, at *4; Hoffman, 2010 WL 2635773, at *4–5; Marks, 2010 WL 
2572988, at *3–4; Villa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10CV81 DMS (WVG), 2010 WL 
935680, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010). 
93 Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *1–2. 
94 Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2; see In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 
WL 2637222, at *3 (D. Mass. July 6, 2011); see also Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *3–4 (finding 
that there was no express private right of action, but rather that Congress designated 
compliance duties solely to Freddie Mac); Villa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10CV81 
DMS (WVG), 2010 WL 935680, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010) (quoting Escobedo, 2009 WL 
4981618, at *3). 
95 Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3; see also Hoffman, 2010 WL 2635773, at *4 (citing 
Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *7) (stating that the agreement does not require modification, 
but requires only consideration of modification); Villa, 2010 WL 935680, at *3 (citing 
Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3) (describing a lack of requirement for loan modification 
stemming from HAMP agreements). 
96 Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3. 
97 See generally Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 09-CV-1985-L(RBB), 2010 
WL 3212131 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010). 
98 Marques, 2010 WL 3212131; cf. Jon Prior, More Failed HAMP Trials End in Foreclosure, 
HOUSINGWIRE, Jan 16, 2012, http://www.housingwire.com/2012/01/16/more-failed-
hamp-trials-end-in-foreclosure (providing statistical evidence of the increase of 
foreclosures in failed HAMP trials). 
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must provide loan modifications and avoid foreclosure using “Program 
Guidelines.”99 
The bank argued that the contracting parties had no intention to give 
third parties the right to sue as evidenced by the contract, stating that 
Fannie Mae will be the administrator and Freddie Mac will be the 
compliance agent.100  The court dismissed this argument.101  The 
language in the remedy and default provisions of the contract was 
deemed an insufficient defense for mortgage servicers, because those 
provisions only pertained to situations where an agreement is in place 
and not when a plaintiff, such as Marques, has been denied loan a 
modification.102 
If HAMP and SPAs do not establish standing under third party 
beneficiary theory, then the question becomes:  Can standing be 
established using the TPP agreement between a borrower and his or her 
servicer?103 
                                                 
99 Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *5; see, e.g., SPA Agreement, supra note 59; Handbook 3.4, 
supra note 9 (evidencing the guidelines, in their current manifestation, referenced in the 
Marques case). 
100 Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *6; see also Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *4 (stating that 
allowing individual claims would undermine Freddie Mac’s role in the compliance 
process); Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 197 (deeming Freddie Mac as the sole 
compliance agent). 
101 Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *6. 
102 Id. 
103 See Wigod v.Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 585–86 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
traditional contract law was an appropriate claim in relation to the TPP); Rackley v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-387-XR, 2011 WL 2971357, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. 
July 21, 2011) (finding that the TPP agreement did not create a new contract due to a lack of 
consideration and contractual language and that it failed to indicate a guaranteed 
modification); In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *3–4 (D. 
Mass. July 6, 2011) (stating that there was sufficient consideration and condition precedent 
under TPP agreements); Stagikas v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136 (D. 
Mass 2011) (finding that although TPP stems from the HAMP agreement, the plaintiffs had 
sufficiently alleged that the TPP was supported with consideration); Bosque v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 350–53 (D. Mass. 2011) (stating that TPP agreement 
between a lender and borrower is sufficient to create a cause of action); Grill v. BAC Home 
Loans Servicing LP, No. 10-CV-03057-FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 127891, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 
14, 2011) (finding a lack of meeting of the minds and non-affirmative contractual language); 
Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2010) 
(finding TPP argument unpersuasive as the claim stems from HAMP regulations and 
therefore is not a separate agreement); Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10-
CV-10380-RGS, 2010 WL 4825632, at *2–4 (D. Mass. Nov. 24, 2010) (denying Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss and discussing TPP and sufficient evidence of intent to maintain the 
suit).  See generally Part II.C (discussing claims brought under TPP agreements). 
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C. Claims Under TPP Agreements 
District courts that support TPP agreements as an affirmative cause of 
action tend to use breach of contract and promissory estoppel—the latter often 
as a corollary to the breach of contract claim.104  A breach of contract claim 
requires four elements:  “(1) the existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff’s 
performance or excuse for nonperformance of the contract; (3) defendant’s 
breach of the contract; and (4) resulting damages.”105 
A contract can be defined as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach 
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some 
way recognizes as a duty.”106  To successfully create such a duty, courts require 
a bargain of offer and acceptance, involving mutual assent and consideration.107 
In cases involving TPP agreements, consideration is almost always in 
question.108  A party has provided consideration when it has paid something, or 
given something up, or suffered a detriment.109  Merely agreeing to perform 
obligations of a prior contract is not deemed to be sufficient consideration for a 
                                                 
104 See generally In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222 (denying a motion to dismiss for lack 
of standing based upon a breach of contract claim stemming from TPP).  The court also 
denied the motion to dismiss the promissory estoppel claim because Plaintiffs reasonably 
relied upon the TPP.  Id.  See also Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d 129 (denying a motion to dismiss 
for lack of standing and failure to state a claim under TPP); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d 342 
(finding sufficient evidence for a claim of breach of contract and promissory estoppel); 
Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632 (denying the motion to dismiss for promissory estoppel and 
breach of contract based on the TPP). 
105 Grill, 2011 WL 127891, at *3 (quoting Armstrong Petrol. Corp. v. Tri Valley Oil & Gas 
Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (2004)); see Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4 (quoting Smith Intern, 
Inc. v. Egle Group, LLC, 490 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2007)); In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 
2637222, at *3 (citing Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 957 F. Supp. 306, 316 (D. Mass. 1997)); 
Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (citing Guckenberger, 957 F. Supp. at 316); Durmic, 2010 WL 
4825632, at *2 (citing Guckenberger, 957 F. Supp. at 316). 
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). 
107 See In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (citing Vadnais v. NSK Steering Sys. Am., 
Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (D. Mass. 2009)); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (citing Trifiro 
v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 845 F.2d 30, 31–32 (1st Cir. 1988)); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (citing 
Vadnais, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 207); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981); see also 
Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel:  An Empirical Analysis Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 673 (2010) (discussing the 
contradiction of traditional contract theory and promissory estoppel). 
108 See In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (focusing on the element of consideration 
in discussing breach of contract); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (denying Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of consideration); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351–53 (denying a 
motion to dismiss for lack of a valid offer, consideration, material terms, and valid measure 
of any damages); Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *2–4 (denying the motion to dismiss a 
breach of contract claim for lack of consideration, material terms, and causal connection 
between harm and damages). 
109 See In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (citing Marine Contractors Co., Inc. v. 
Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 919 (D. Mass. 1974)); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136; Durmic, 2010 
WL 4825632, at *3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981); Jimenez, supra note 
107, at 673. 
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new contract.110  Mortgage servicers, when addressing consideration, often 
argue that because borrowers were already required to make mortgage payments 
there is no new consideration under TPP.111  Borrowers, on the other hand, 
submit that the rule of pre-existing legal duty is not applicable because new 
consideration is given in the form of legal representations, submissions of 
financials, partaking in credit counseling, opening of escrow accounts, and trial 
payments under a TPP agreement.112 
The issues of offer and material terms have also been raised.113  An offer is 
a stated intention by one party to enter into a bargain thus inviting another party 
into an agreement.114  Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., asserts that the 
servicer, in providing a TPP agreement to a borrower, is making an offer 
because the agreement has signature lines, HAMP guidelines refer to TPP 
agreements as an “offer,” and there is a “time is of the essence” clause.115 
The greatest controversy in establishing a right of action involves 
interpretations and the source of the material terms of TPP agreements.116  
                                                 
110 See In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (quoting In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d 
882, 890 (1st Cir. 1980)); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (citing In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 
F.3d at 890); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351–52 (citing In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.3d at 890); 
Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3 (quoting In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d at 890). 
111 See Rackley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-387-XR, 2011 WL 2971357, 
at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2011) (citing McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Wash. Capital Dus, Inc. 
66 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1995)); In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (quoting In re Lloyd, 
Carr & Co., 617 F.2d at 890); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (citing In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 
617 F.3d at 890); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351–52 (citing In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.3d at 
890); Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3 (quoting In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d at 890). 
112 See In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4; Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136; Bosque, 
762 F. Supp. 2d at 352; Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3. 
113 See Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (denying a motion to dismiss for lack of a valid offer, 
material terms, and valid measure of any damages); Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4 
(denying the motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim for lack of material terms). 
114 Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (D. Mass. 2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 24 (1981). 
115 Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351; see Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-987-AC, 2010 
WL 5148473, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (discussing the Plaintiff’s claim of an offer, but 
making no direct reference as to whether there was a valid claim).  Rather, the court 
dismissed the independent contract theory as a whole because Vida’s claim stemmed from 
HAMP, which did not allow a private action.  Id.  See also, eg., Home Affordable 
Modification Trial Period Notice, MAKING HOME Affordable, 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/borrower.jsp (follow “Firm Solicitation 
Offers;” then follow “Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan Notice” hyperlink).  
But see Grill v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 10-CV-03057-FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 
127891, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011)  (quoting Banner Entm’t, Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. 
Cnty., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598 (1989)) (discussing the need for a “meeting of the minds”). 
116 See Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *3–4 (finding that the TPP agreement did not create a 
new contract due to lack of consideration and contractual language, which would fail to 
indicate a guaranteed modification); In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *3–4 (stating 
that there was sufficient consideration and condition precedent under TPP agreements to 
satisfy standing); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 135–36 (dismissing a motion to dismiss based 
upon TPP and stating that although TPP stems from HAMP, the agreement provides a 
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Mortgage servicers, in defending against claims on the basis of TPP, assert that 
because TPP agreements allow for a modification to be denied if a borrower 
does not meet all the criteria, they contain no material terms and therefore do not 
constitute enforceable contracts.117  However, courts finding that TPP 
agreements contain sufficient material terms have taken the position that TPP is 
not a loan agreement, but rather a promise to provide a loan agreement.118 
Lastly, the question asked by several courts, when considering TPP for the 
purposes of creating a right of action, is whether this is simply an end-run 
around third party beneficiary and therefore precluding private action.119 
1. Major Cases Relating to HAMP and TPP Agreements 
Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. was brought by a group of 
borrowers who had fallen behind on their loans and who either were 
solicited by J.P. Morgan Chase for the loan modification program, or 
independently learned of HAMP and initiated a request.120  The court 
stated, “[t]he TPP is a Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac ‘Uniform Instrument’ 
that has the appearances of a contract.”121  The TPP agreement between 
the borrower and Chase expressly stated that if the borrower stayed in 
compliance with the TPP requirements, the servicer would provide a 
Home Affordable Modification Agreement.122  The Plaintiffs followed all 
of the requirements, successfully passing the NPV test, meeting all of 
HAMP requirements, signing a TPP agreement, submitting proof of 
                                                                                                             
proper cause of action); Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931–32 (N.D. 
Ill. 2011) (finding that TPP does create a cause of action for a breach of contract claim); 
Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 350–53 (stating that the TPP agreement between a lender and 
borrower is sufficient to create a cause of action); Grill, 2011 WL 127891, at *3–4 (finding a 
lack of meeting of the minds and non-affirmative contractual language); Vida, 2010 WL 
5148473, at *5 (finding the TPP argument unpersuasive because the claim stems from 
HAMP regulations and therefore is not a separate agreement); Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at 
*2–4 (denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss under TPP and finding sufficient evidence of 
intent to maintain the suit). 
117 See Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4; Bourdelais v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 
3:10CV670-HEH, 2011 WL 1306311, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2011); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d 
at 352; Grill, 2011 WL 127891, at *4; Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4. 
118 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4 (stating that this was sufficient to state a claim for 
breach of contract); see In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4; Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 
352. 
119 See Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *3; Bourdelais, 2011 WL 1306311, at *4; Grill, 2011 WL 
127891, at *3–4; Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5. 
120 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1. 
121 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1; see Belyea v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP, No. 10-
10931-DJC, 2011 WL 2884964, at *2 (D. Mass. July 15, 2011) (quoting Durmic, 2010 WL 
4825632, at *1); Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (quoting Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1); 
Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 348 (quoting Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1). 
122 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1; see Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *2–3; Stagikas, 795 F. 
Supp. 2d at 133–34; Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 348. 
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income, and making the three required payments.123  However, none of 
the Plaintiffs received an executed TPP or modification agreement.124  
The Durmic court agreed with Chase that HAMP precluded a private 
right of action under HAMP alone, but because this case was being 
contested based upon the TPP agreement between Chase and the 
borrower, Plaintiffs had successfully stated a cause of action.125 
Chase initially claimed that Plaintiffs were prevented from bringing 
suit based on breach of contract because of a lack of consideration.126  
The mortgage company argued that the monthly payments the Plaintiffs 
made under the TPP agreement did not constitute consideration because 
“performance of a pre-existing legal duty that is neither doubtful nor 
subject to honest and reasonable dispute is not valid consideration where 
the duty is owed to the promisor, or to the public at large.”127  However, 
the court dismissed this theory and ruled that the Plaintiffs were 
required to relinquish more than simply the TPP payments.128  
Specifically, the Plaintiffs were required to provide documentation of 
their income, make legal representations of their current circumstances, 
agree to undergo credit counseling, and in some cases make payments 
into an escrow account.129 
                                                 
123 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *2. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at *4; see Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *6; Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136; Fletcher v. 
OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 350–
51. 
126 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3; see Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *7; In re Bank of Am., 
No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (D. Mass. July 6, 2011); Stagikas, 795 F. 
Supp. 2d at 136; Fletcher, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 931; Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351. 
127 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3 (quoting In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d 882, 890 (1st 
Cir. 1980)); see Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *7 (citing In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d at 890); 
In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (quoting In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d at 890); 
Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (citing In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d at 890); Fletcher, 798 F. 
Supp. 2d at 931–32 (citing DiLorenzo v. Valve & Primer Corp., 807 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2004)); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351–52 (citing In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d at 
890). 
128 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3; see Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *8; In re Bank of Am., 
2011 WL 2637222, at *4; Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136; Fletcher, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 932; 
Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 352. 
129 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3; see Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *8 (quoting Durmic, 
2010 WL 4825632, at *3); In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (citing Durmic, 2010 WL 
4825632, at *3); Stagikas, 2011 WL 2652445, at *5 (quoting Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3); 
Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (quoting Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3); see also Chiles & 
Mitchell, supra note 9, at 195–96 (explaining the additional elements of the initial package 
that homeowners must submit to qualify under TPP rules).  Homeowner must submit a 
Request for Modification and Affidavit (“RMA”) Form, an IRS Form 4506–T or 4506T–EZ, 
and lastly provide evidence of the homeowner’s income.  Id. 
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Lastly, Chase put forth a defense based on lack of material terms 
(principal amount, monthly payment, applicable interest, loan term, or 
escrow payments), arguing that the TPP was really a contingent 
agreement.130  The Plaintiffs’ premise was that this was not a loan 
agreement per se, but rather “a promise to provide Plaintiffs with [a loan 
agreement] at a specified date . . . .”131  An alternative theory suggests 
that not all terms of an agreement must be specified, and, because the 
terms are well established through mathematical equations put forth by 
HAMP, the terms were already in place.132  The court held that the issue 
of the parties’ intent could not be resolved in the context of a motion to 
dismiss.133 
In Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., borrowers gained a great victory 
when the Seventh Circuit bought into the concept that TPP agreements 
create a new contractual relationship.134  The court determined that a 
TPP agreement contains a valid offer, clear and definite terms, and 
consideration under Illinois State common law.135 
Similar to previous arguments, Wells Fargo claimed that, because the 
TPP agreement required further review of Wigod’s financials, this did 
not qualify as an offer for modification.136  However, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected this claim, finding that “when the promisor conditions a 
promise on his own future action or approval, there is no binding offer.  
But when the promise is conditioned on the performance of some act by 
the promisee or a third party, there can be a valid offer.”137  In the case of 
the TPP agreement, there were two specific actions which Wigod had to 
accomplish before a modification could be made:  (1) comply with the 
requirements of the trial plan, and (2) make true and accurate financial 
submissions.138  Wells Fargo argued in the alternative that it reserved the 
right to determine whether Wigod qualified for a loan modification, but 
the court, rejecting this theory, stated that if Wells Fargo had wanted to 
cancel the TPP, its opportunity was before it countersigned the TPP 
agreement; thus, the court held that Wigod needed simply to complete 
                                                 
130 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4; see Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *8; Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 
2d at 352. 
131 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4; see also Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *8 (arguing that 
the TPP simply provides for a decision on the modification); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 352 
(arguing that the agreement simply controls the three month trial period and will entitle 
borrower to either a modification or a decision on the modification). 
132 Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4. 
133 Id.; see Belyea, 2011 WL 2884964, at *8. 
134 See generally Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012). 
135 Id. at 561–66. 
136 Id. at 561. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 562. 
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the proper payments.139  The court determined that to interpret the 
agreement any other way would provide Wells Fargo an opportunity to 
cancel the agreement based on its own whims, rather than the criteria set 
forth in the TPP.140 
Next, Wells Fargo challenged the consideration element of the TPP, 
arguing that there was a need for a “bargained-for exchange.”141  Like 
many other cases, the issue of pre-existing legal obligation was raised as 
a concern.142  The court found that there were sufficient legal detriments 
including:  opening a new escrow account, potentially undergoing credit 
counseling, and providing and vouching for the truth and accuracy of 
financial information.143 
Last, Wells Fargo claimed that there were insufficient material 
terms.144  The court agreed with Wells Fargo that the TPP only provided 
an “estimate” and that the lender had some discretion as to the final 
terms, but nonetheless it determined that the future terms were 
“independent of a party’s mere ‘wish, will, and desire.’”145  It was the 
court’s determination that the terms were predominantly set by HAMP 
guidelines and the NPV waterfall test, which Wigod would have 
reasonably relied upon.146  While the terms may not have been fully 
hashed out, it was clear to the court that the two parties had agreed to a 
modification based on Wigod’s compliance with the TPP.147 
On the other hand, Rackley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. sums up the 
approach taken by courts that have rejected TPP for a lack of 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 See id. at 563.  The TPP agreement states: 
I understand that the Plan is not a modification of the Loan Documents 
and that the Loan Documents will not be modified unless and until (i) I 
meet all of the conditions required for modification, (ii) I receive a fully 
executed copy of the Modification Agreement, and (iii) the 
Modification Effective Date has passed. 
Id.  However, the court did not find this to mean that Wells Fargo held the right to deny the 
contract at any point for reasons such as “interest rates went up, the economy soured, it 
just didn’t like Wigod,” but rather it stated that the language provides requirements of the 
promisee and therefore constitutes a valid offer.  Id. 
141 See id. at 563–64. 
142 See id. at 563; see, e.g., infra note 212 (providing a list of cases in which courts have 
discussed the issue revolving around pre-existing legal duties). 
143 Wigod, 673 F.3d at 563. 
144 Id.  Wells Fargo argued that because the terms were to be determined at a later date 
there could be no “meeting of the minds,” and therefore there was no enforceable 
agreement.  Id. 
145 See id. at 564–65 (quoting United States v. Orr Constr. Co.¸ 560 F.2d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 
1977)). 
146 See id. at 565. 
147 Id. 
Jacobs: Help or Hamp(er)?—The Courts' Reluctance to Provide the Right to
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
296 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
consideration.148  Plaintiff entered into a TPP agreement to make 
modified monthly payments for a three-month trial period and to 
provide documentation of his finances.149  Plaintiff made the scheduled 
payments and provided the financial information, but his home was still 
foreclosed upon.150  The court in Rackley rejected the payments under 
TPP as consideration, because Plaintiff would have been required to 
make payments prior to his TPP agreement.151  The court emphasized 
that the TPP is only providing an “estimate” and that the lender’s 
obligation to modify arises only after, among other things, “borrower 
receipt of a lender-executed Modification Agreement before the 
Modification Effective date.”152 
With so many questions facing homeowners in cases pertaining to 
HAMP, the following section will attempt to provide the reader with a 
full analysis of the previous two arguments.153 
III.  ANALYSIS 
This section discusses and evaluates arguments made by 
homeowners under HAMP using either third party beneficiary standing 
or TPP agreements to create a new contractual relationship.154  Part III.A 
examines the competing interests in determining the applicability of 
third party beneficiary standing involving HAMP litigation.155  Part III.B 
assesses the arguments as to whether TPP agreements constitute a new 
contractual relationship under which borrowers can bring a private 
action.156 
                                                 
148 Rackley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-387-XR, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4 
(W.D. Tex. July 21, 2011). 
149 Id. at *1. 
150 Id. 
151 Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4; see Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-987-AC, 2010 
WL 5148473, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (citing Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 10-
CV-266-AC, 2010 WL 4338326, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 26, 2010)). 
152 Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4. 
153 See infra Part III (analyzing the arguments involved in gaining standing for cases 
stemming from HAMP). 
154 See infra Part III.A–B (analyzing the arguments used to determine standing in cases 
involving third party beneficiaries and TPP agreements). 
155 See infra Part III.A (laying out a clear definition, both sides of the argument, and 
external factors that may be playing a role in the decision making of the courts). 
156 See infra Part III.B (discussing the issues of consideration and offer as they pertain to 
TPP and the creation of a new contract). 
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A. Third Party Beneficiary 
Across the country, a number of cases have been brought before 
district courts pertaining to HAMP and the assertion of third party 
standing by borrowers.157  While the majority of courts have dismissed 
the theory of third party beneficiary standing based on insufficient 
evidence of governmental intent, a few decisions have accepted the 
stated goals of the government program as adequate evidence of 
governmental intent to create standing.158  The issues facing the courts 
are not based solely upon the empirical evidence, but also the public 
                                                 
157 See In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (D. Mass. July 6, 
2011) (stating that there is no third party standing stemming from HAMP); Phipps v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV F 10-2025 LJO SKO, 2011 WL 302803, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 
2011) (dismissing Plaintiff’s standing as a third party beneficiary stating, “[t]he complaint 
lacks facts to support a third-party beneficiary theory of relief”); Zoher v. Chase Home Fin., 
No. 10-14135-CIV, 2010 WL 4064798, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2010) (dismissing an attempt 
by the plaintiffs to enforce HAMP compliance as a third party beneficiary); Hammonds v. 
Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, No. EDCV 10-1025 AG (OPx), 2010 WL 3859069, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 27, 2010) (indicating that HAMP does not create third party beneficiary standing); 
Hart v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting 
Aleem v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. EDCV 09-01812-VAP (RZx), 2010 WL 532330 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 9, 2010)) (“There is no express or implied right to sue fund recipients . . .  under TARP 
or HAMP.”); Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 09-cv-1985-L(RBB), 2010 WL 
3212131, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (stating that a party could bring suit as a third party 
beneficiary, but that the Plaintiff at hand needed to amend his claim to specifically show 
details about his modification situation); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 
2010 WL 2635773, at *2–5 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010) (denying third party standing); Marks v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988, at *3–5 (D. Ariz. June 
22, 2010) (denying Plaintiff’s standing as a third party beneficiary); Benito v. Indymac 
Mortg. Servs., No. 2:09-CV-001218-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7 (D. Nev. May 21, 
2010) (denying third party standing, stating that “government contracts are ‘assumed to be 
incidental beneficiaries . . . ’” and the plaintiffs did not display any intent within the HAMP 
contract); Villa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10CV81 DMS (WVG), 2010 WL 935680, at *3 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010) (citing Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 
DTM (BLM), 2009 WL 4981618, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009)) (determining that there 
was a lack of third party standing); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2–3 (dismissing the 
breach of contract claim based on third party beneficiary, stating “[q]ualified borrowers are 
incidental beneficiaries of the Agreement and do not have enforceable rights under the 
contract”); Reyes v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., No. 09cv1366 DMS (WMC), 2009 WL 3738177, at 
*2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) (“Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support his third party 
beneficiary theory.”). 
158 See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text (discussing the merits of third party 
beneficiary standing pertaining to actions brought by private citizens in reference to the 
SPAs between the federal government and participating mortgage servicers); see infra notes 
185–88 and accompanying text (discussing the Marques case and finding that there is 
express language supporting borrowers as third party beneficiaries). 
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policy problems involved with third party beneficiary doctrine and 
government contracts.159 
1. Third Party Beneficiary 
The basic rule, when relating third party beneficiary status to 
government contracts, is that taxpayers do not have a right to bring 
private action to enforce government contracts unless they are intended 
beneficiaries and not just incidental beneficiaries.160  Third party 
beneficiary standing may be established either by analyzing the 
language within the contract or by construing the circumstances which 
led to the creation.161 
The issue has been interpreted in Klamath Water Users Protective 
Association v. Patterson and Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County.162  These 
two cases establish the precedents for the interpretation of HAMP and 
third party beneficiaries, defining the difference between “intended 
beneficiaries” and “incidental beneficiaries.”163  Astra USA, Inc. is 
particularly important because it illustrates the difficult task facing the 
courts in construing the difference between intended and incidental 
                                                 
159 See Tiefer, supra note 89, at 771 (discussing some of the policy of third party 
beneficiary).  “[A] right of action is favored ‘when there is evidence that the existing 
remedies are inadequate and that additional remedies would increase the likelihood of 
compliance and afford direct relief to a class which the legislature wished to protect.’”  Id. 
See also Crowder, supra note 69, at 307 (discussing the difficulty in inferring intent, the 
author writes “[t]he relevant intent to be divined is [not] . . . that of a single individual or 
entity, but rather that of an amalgam of legislative bodies, administrative agencies, and 
government officials—each of whom may have differing expectations and objectives with 
regard to the contract”).  See generally Adelson, supra note 69 (arguing that although the 
statutes provide power to administrative agencies, it is the agencies themselves who 
provide the wording and documentation for government contracts).  Therefore, the court 
should look to an agency’s intentions, because the agency is the actual contracting body.  
Id. 
160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1981); see also Morgan, supra note 74, at 
625–26. 
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1981); see also Crowder, supra note 69, at 
306 (discussing the contractual language as well as the interpretation stemming from the 
circumstances forming the contract); Morgan, supra note 74, at 625–26 (emphasizing the 
need for explicit language to establish intended parties). 
162 Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1348 (2011) (citing J. MURRAY, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 45.6, at 92 (rev. ed. 2007)); Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n 
v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the differences between an 
intended and incidental beneficiary involving a government contract). 
163 In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (D. Mass. July 6, 
2011); Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988, at *4 
(D. Ariz. June 22, 2010); Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 
DTM(BLM), 2009 WL 4981618, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009). 
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beneficiaries.164  In the case of HAMP this is particularly difficult because 
one must wonder exactly who was intended when the foreword of the 
guidelines describes Making Home Affordable as a program “to stabilize 
the housing market and help struggling homeowners.”165  Is it all 
homeowners, including the neighbors of foreclosed-upon borrowers, 
given the effects that the foreclosure will have on their own property 
value?166  Should it be only homeowners who have participated in 
HAMP? 167  Or is it exclusively Fannie Mae and the mortgage servicer 
who have agreed to an SPA?168 
2. Majority Opinion:  District Court Cases Opposing Third Party 
Beneficiary Standing 
Escobedo is the preeminent case opposing third party beneficiary 
standing in HAMP cases.169  Escobedo, interpreting the SPA, sparked a 
ground swell in favor of mortgage servicers, denying the “clear intent” 
needed for third party beneficiary standing.170  Escobedo stands for the 
                                                 
164 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between the intent 
to benefit a party and an intention for that party to receive a right of action). 
165 Handbook 3.4, supra note 9. 
166 See Soaring Spillover:  Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billion in 2009 
Alone; 69.5 Million Homes Lose $7,200 on Average, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, May 
2009, http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/soaring-
spillover-3-09.pdf (displaying the drastic effects that foreclosure can have upon the value of 
neighboring properties).  The Center for Responsible Lending estimated that in 2009 alone 
foreclosures would cause “69.5 million nearby homes to suffer price declines averaging 
$7,200 per home and resulting in a $502 billion total decline in property values.”  Id. at 1. 
167 See supra Part II.A (defining homeowners who are eligible to participate in HAMP and 
the steps necessary towards modification). 
168 See SPA Agreement, supra note 59, at 13 (providing only signature sections for Fannie 
Mae and the servicer). 
169 See generally Bourdelais v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 3:10CV670-HEH, 2011 WL 
1306311, at *3 (Apr. 1, 2011) (explaining that private citizens have been deemed “incidental 
beneficiaries” by most courts); Zoher v. Chase Home Fin., No. 10-14135-CIV, 2010 WL 
4064798, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2010) (stating that it would be unreasonable for private 
citizens to rely on the SPA because there is specific language allowing for loans not to be 
granted); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010 WL 2635773, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. June 30, 2010) (dismissing the Plaintiff’s third party beneficiary claim); Marks v. Bank 
of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. June 22, 
2010) (describing Escobedo’s use of the Klamath case in its reasoning that private citizens are 
not to be considered third party beneficiaries); Villa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10CV81 
DMS (WVG), 2010 WL 935680 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010) (citing Escobedo v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 DTM (BLM), 2009 WL 4981618, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 
2009)) (discussing third party beneficiaries).  Escobedo was persuasive enough to Justice 
Sabraw that he reversed direction from his previous decision.  Id.; Reyes v. Saxon Mortg. 
Servs., No. 09cv1366 DMS, 2009 WL 3738177 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009). 
170 See generally Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618.  Escobedo has essentially outlined the briefs for 
mortgage servicers because it has been cited in many courts and provides the dominant 
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proposition that there is no clear intent to establish third party 
beneficiary standing in SPA agreements, and this decision’s influence 
upon other courts has created a significant burden to borrowers in trying 
to gain standing.171 
Other cases opposing the use of third party beneficiary as a means 
for private action also focus upon the language within the SPA.172  One 
problem in focusing on the language of the SPA is that it incorporates the 
Making Home Affordable Program:  Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE 
Mortgages, and the handbook is constantly being updated, which can 
create confusion.173 
There are three primary arguments in construing the ambiguity of 
SPA language, which explain why borrowers should be considered 
incidental beneficiaries rather than intended beneficiaries:  (1) within the 
SPA there is specific language stating that the SPA “shall inure to the 
benefit of . . . the parties to the Agreement and their permitted successors-in-
interest,” which might be interpreted to mean that third parties are 
precluded;174 (2) because there is no explicit mention of a third party 
beneficiary, a court may determine that there was no intention for the 
benefit to be created; and (3) due to a lack of requirements for service 
providers to give modifications under the SPA, it is unreasonable for 
borrowers to depend on the SPA for standing.175 
The court’s decision in Benito illustrates the troubling dependence of 
the courts on the requirement to find “express intention.”176  Specifically, 
the court acknowledged that HAMP “undoubtedly has a goal of 
                                                                                                             
perspective involving HAMP.  See, e.g., Zoher, 2010 WL 4064798, at * 4; Hoffman, 2010 WL 
2635773, at *4–5; Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *3–4; Villa, 2010 WL 935680, at *3. 
171 See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the ruling and reasoning in the Escobedo case). 
172 See In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *3; Hoffman, 2010 WL 2635773, at *4; Benito 
v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., No. 2:09-CV-001218-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 2130648, at *6–7 (D. 
Nev. May 21, 2010). 
173 See generally SPA Agreement, supra note 59 (providing the legal framework under 
TARP to enter into an agreement between U.S. Treasury and a service provider with Fannie 
Mae as the administrator and Freddie Mac as the compliance agent and stating that the 
specific terms are incorporated from the MHA handbook); Handbook 3.4, supra note 9 
(providing the guidelines and rules for which servicers are held, based upon their SPAs).  
GSE is defined as Government Sponsored Entities.  Sichtermann, supra note 43, at 271. 
174 See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the quoted language which 
displays no clear intention from the government to qualify homeowners as intended 
beneficiaries). 
175 See infra notes 185–88 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of clear intent, 
because there is no express mention of homeowners and that without clear intent it would 
be unreasonable for a homeowner to rely upon SPAs to create private standing between 
service providers and the federal government). 
176 See infra note 177 and accompanying text (illustrating the paralyzing effects that an 
“express intention” criterion may have on judges whom recognize the benefit to 
homeowners, but feel that they cannot oblige in providing standing). 
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assisting homeowners,” but still found that there was no express 
intention and thus no right of action.177  There is a presumption that 
government contracts create incidental beneficiaries, rather than 
intended beneficiaries.178  The lack of express intention places private 
actors at a distinct disadvantage when bringing an action because of the 
presumption that government contracts create incidental beneficiaries, 
rather than intended beneficiaries.179 
Furthermore, those opposing third party beneficiary standing in 
relation to HAMP have argued that the mortgage servicers were not 
required to provide modifications, and therefore borrowers’ reliance on 
HAMP would be unreasonable.180  Escobedo specifically emphasizes that 
the HAMP Guidelines require participating servicers only “to consider all 
eligible loans under the program guidelines . . . .”181  This reasoning can 
be taken a step further by arguing that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as 
government agents which are named parties in the SPA, lack the right to 
                                                 
177 Benito, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7; see also Hammonds, 2010 WL 3859069, at *3 (“Even 
though the contract does benefit homeowners such as Plaintiff, the contract lacks the 
required clear intention.”); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010 WL 
2635773, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010) (“[T]hough the agreement was made with the 
benefit of qualified borrowers in mind, the language of the agreement itself does not grant 
them enforceable rights.”); Benito, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7 (“Although the overall HAMP 
program undoubtedly has a goal of assisting homeowners, the HAMP contract does not 
express any intent to grant borrowers a right to enforce the HAMP contract . . . .”). 
178 Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999); 
In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (D. Mass. July 6, 2011) 
(quoting Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 10-cv-11503-NMG, 2010 WL 
5174510 (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2010)); Hammonds, 2010 WL 3859069, at *3 (quoting Klamath 
Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999)); Benito, 2010 WL 
2130648, at *7 (quoting Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 
2009)); Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 DTM (BLM), 2009 WL 
4981618, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 313(2) (1979)). 
179 In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *3 (quoting Speleos, 2010 WL 5174510); 
Hammonds, 2010 WL 3859069, at *3 (quoting Klamath, 204 F.3d 1206); Marques, 2010 WL 
3212131, at *4 (quoting Astra USA, 588 F.3d at 1244); Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *3 (citing 
Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1211); Benito, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7 (quoting Astra USA, 588 F.3d at 
1244); Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 313(2) (1979)); Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1211. 
180 Hart v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2010) 
(citing Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3); Hoffman, 2010 WL 2635773, at *4; Marks, 2010 WL 
2572988, at *3; Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3; see also Benito, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7 
(asserting that even Fannie Mae cannot force a mortgage servicer to provide a 
modification). 
181 Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3; see also Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *3 n.3 (quoting 
Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3). 
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force a modification upon lenders.182  Collectively, these interpretations 
are a gauntlet of bad news for borrowers.183 
However, even with the appearance of a dominant interpretation, 
this is not a unanimous interpretation and borrowers should not give up 
all hope.184 
3. Minority Opinion:  Supporting Third Party Beneficiary Standing 
Although the deck is stacked against homeowners with the majority 
of cases ruling against borrowers, Marques should provide some hope.185  
It is clear that the agreement between the federal government and 
mortgage servicers expressly states that a servicer should provide loan 
modifications and avoid foreclosure using “Program Guidelines.”186  For 
example, the Marques court highlighted language from the SPA, such as: 
“[s]ervicer shall perform the Services for all mortgage loans it services”; 
“[p]articipating servicers are required to consider all eligible loans under 
the program guidelines unless precluded by the rules”; and “[e]very 
potentially eligible borrower who calls or writes in to their servicer in 
reference to a modification must be screened for hardship.”187  Marques, 
in discussing the SPA and the enabling legislation surrounding it, shows 
clearly that homeowners are intended beneficiaries and not just 
incidental.188 
                                                 
182 See Benito, 2010 WL 2130648, at *7. 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 174–75 (offering three unique explanations for why 
servicers do not need to provide loan modifications and each appear to be progressively 
insurmountable). 
184 See Infra Part III.A.4. 
185 See generally Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 09-cv-1985-L(RBB), 2010 
WL 3212131 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (discussing third party beneficiary and how the 
servicer agreements provide a requirement for modifications); Part II.B.1 (providing the 
history involved in third party beneficiary and comparing the majority opinion with the 
minority opinion). 
186 See Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *5; see also Cook-Mack & Parady, supra note 16, at 
376 (discussing the “clear intent” requirement, which has been established in Marques, 
other state cases, and the public records). 
187 Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *5. 
188 See Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *5; see also Sampson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 
Inc., No. CV 10-08836 DDP (SSx), 2010 WL 5397236, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) 
(emphasizing that HAMP’s clearly stated mission is “foreclosure prevention” and thus 
homeowners in danger of being foreclosed upon must be intended beneficiaries); Cook-
Mack & Parady, supra note 16, at 376 (discussing the “clear intent” requirement established 
in Marques, other state cases, and the public records). 
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4. Ambiguities, Public Policy, and Ramifications 
One can see from the sections above that there are some obvious 
ambiguities within the SPA.189  The existence of these ambiguities allows 
judges to read the agreement as requiring modification, or, at the very 
least, the opportunity for modification, whereas other judges could fairly 
claim there is no requirement for modification.190  A better reading of the 
law is to define “intended beneficiaries” for modification as those who 
achieve certain milestones in the HAMP process, such that their reliance 
would be deemed reasonable.191  Doing so would provide homeowners 
an opportunity to defend their homes while still limiting the amount of 
cases that homeowners can bring before the court.192 
As mentioned previously, a number of courts have acknowledged 
that SPAs were entered into, in part, for the benefit of borrowers, but 
several of these courts have expressed a concern that permitting third 
party beneficiary standing would “open the flood gates” to litigation.193  
Although there is merit to the argument that there could be a staggering 
number of potential lawsuits if third party beneficiary standing were 
accorded to all mortgage holders in these cases, the problem with the 
theory of “floodgates” is that courts cannot know the actual effects on the 
judicial system of allowing third party beneficiary standing under 
HAMP.194 
                                                 
189 See supra Part III.A.2–3 (discussing the majority and minority opinions interpreting 
SPAs). 
190 See supra Part III.A.2–3 (comparing and contrasting whether the SPA creates a 
requirement for modification). 
191 See supra Part III.A.2–3 (interpreting the language within the SPA in order to 
distinguish the intended beneficiaries).  However, if borrowers do comply with all of the 
requirements, the argument can be made that reliance would be reasonable, and thus one 
could argue that these borrowers should be “intended beneficiaries” because “the 
beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to 
confer a right on him or her.”  Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cv1557 
BTM (BLM), 2009 WL 4981618, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009) (quoting Klamath Water Users 
Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
192 See infra Part IV (offering a new right for homeowners under Making Home 
Affordable program guidelines). 
193 See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text (illustrating that certain courts 
recognize the HAMP program as being developed with homeowners at least partially in 
mind). 
194 See generally Stern, supra note 91, at 402–04 (discussing the inability of courts to gauge 
the actual effects of allowing litigation).  “The ‘floodgates of litigation’ argument has 
proven wrong time and again.  The lifting of the ‘impact’ rule in rewarding damages for 
mental anguish, allowing third parties to recover under contracts, and the recognition of 
the right to privacy, were all prophesied to overwhelm the court with frivolous claims.  
They have not.”  Id. at 403. 
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Unfortunately, judges fearing this floodgate of litigation are often too 
quick on the draw and fail to adequately examine the legislative intent, 
which results in inconsistent rulings.195  Courts should not be concerned 
about the possible increase of litigation on this issue; rather, they should 
permit the U.S. Treasury to address the potential issues by creating 
guidelines.196  Furthermore, it can be argued that there is simply a need 
to address something because it is wrong, and there is a pressing need 
for “legal redress.”197  The remaining portion of this analysis will discuss 
some of these alternatives in relationship to HAMP.198 
One approach to combat the imbalance amongst the courts as to 
whether borrowers should be granted third party beneficiary standing is 
to weigh the impact of creating new remedies based on the original 
statute’s goals.199  But as we have seen from some previous rulings 
relating to HAMP, there is an obvious fear of unfettered litigation, and 
the ability to create new remedies may open the door to more 
litigation.200 
Another approach is based upon “justifiable reliance.”201  Justifiable 
reliance is interpreted using the surrounding commercial and social 
circumstances.202  TARP and HAMP were created to combat an economic 
crisis and were portrayed in the media as being for the benefit of 
homeowners so that they could keep their homes.203  Courts finding in 
favor of homeowners often choose to use distinct and strong 
terminology, such as “crisis,” when describing the 2008 economic 
                                                 
195 See generally Stern, supra note 91 (arguing against the use of “floodgates of litigation” 
reasoning in deciding cases). 
196 See infra text accompanying notes 234–35 (illustrating the author’s proposed 
amendment to the HAMP guidelines ).  See generally Handbook 3.4, supra note 9 (providing 
the guidelines and rules for servicers, the criteria of who is to be considered eligible for 
loan modification, and the course of action available to borrowers who are denied a 
modification). 
197 See Stern, supra note 91, at 398 (arguing that because of the litigious nature of our 
society there is an even greater need for people to be heard and that preventing suits due to 
the number may be unfairly biased against merit based suits).  W. Page Keeton said, “[i]t is 
the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood of 
litigation,’ and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to 
deny relief on such grounds.”  Id. at 398–99. 
198 See infra notes 199–207 and accompanying text (discussing alternative methods for 
interpreting third party beneficiary standing and how it may relate to HAMP). 
199 Alvino, supra note 75, at 917. 
200 See supra note 91 (discussing the debate amongst courts and scholars regarding the 
fear of opening litigation to anyone). 
201 See supra text accompanying note 86 (defining “justifiable reliance”). 
202 See supra note 86 (promoting a justifiable reliance theory, which may be beneficial to 
borrowers considering the economic environment at the time of the creation of HAMP). 
203 See supra Part II (discussing the circumstances that led to the creation of HAMP and 
TARP). 
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condition, and one might argue that this is, in and of itself, an 
application of justifiable reliance.204 
Another approach to establish third party beneficiary standing is to 
use the intentions of the administrative agency that developed or is 
charged with implementing the governmental contract, rather than the 
language of the applicable statute.205  This would perhaps be the best 
support for borrowers in gaining third party beneficiary standing 
because of the Treasury Department’s announced intentions and 
purpose in creating HAMP.206  The counter argument, without denying 
the intentions of the Treasury Department, would be that this intention is 
insufficient to distinguish borrowers as an intended beneficiary from an 
incidental beneficiary.207 
In sum, most courts addressing the issue have rejected homeowners’ 
attempts to obtain standing in HAMP related litigation as third party 
beneficiaries, and homeowners are searching for a new avenue of 
litigation based on TPP agreements.208 
B. TPP Agreements 
An alternative theory to third party beneficiary standing is that TPP 
agreements create a new contractual relationship separate from the 
SPA.209  However, there are two questions that should be asked when 
discussing the use of TPP agreements to establish standing:  (1) Is there 
proper consideration to constitute a contract, and (2) does the TPP 
agreement constitute an offer with material terms?210 
                                                 
204 See supra note 22 (illustrating the economic environment in 2008 and providing 
examples of the potentially loaded wording used to decipher who should be deemed an 
“intended” beneficiary). 
205 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (proposing that when interpreting 
“intended” beneficiaries the courts should look to the intentions of the agencies and not 
just to the legislative intent).  The principles put forth by Adelson pertaining exclusively to 
administrative agencies can be taken further to relate not just to the agencies but any 
governmental body other than the legislature that has aided in the design and 
implementation of a program. 
206 See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text (providing a background of the creation 
of HAMP). 
207 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (recognizing that Congress considered 
homeowners in part when creating HAMP, but Congress did not necessarily deem them as 
intended beneficiaries). 
208 See infra Part III.B (analyzing arguments pertaining to TPP agreements and a right to 
private action). 
209 See supra note 108 (citing cases that have discussed the issue of TPP agreements 
creating a right to private action based on contract theory with a particular focus on the 
consideration element). 
210 See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (citing to cases that discuss the issue of 
consideration and the issue of offer pertaining to material terms). 
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1. Is There Proper Consideration to Constitute a Contract? 
In regards to consideration and TPP agreements, the question is 
whether the additional actions taken by a borrower participating in the 
program are to be considered additional consideration, or whether the 
TPP is lacking consideration because it is simply a promise to make 
payments, which homeowners were previously obligated to make in 
compliance with their mortgage note.211  Those who oppose using TPP to 
establish a cause of action argue that the TPP requires only that the 
homeowner perform pre-existing legal duties; therefore, their actions 
cannot constitute new consideration.212  On the other hand, it can be 
argued that there are additional requirements created by TPP that are 
separate from the original mortgage agreement, and therefore the TPP 
would constitute a new contract and not a prior obligation.213 
The split in interpretations as to what constitutes new consideration 
reflects different readings of the original lending agreements between 
borrowers and lenders, as some cases have found auxiliary 
requirements, such as submission of financial statements in the original 
lending agreements to be a pre-existing requirement, while other courts 
interpret this as a new requirement.214  However, borrowers could argue 
that making legal representations of their financial situation, undergoing 
credit counseling, opening new escrow accounts, and paying new fees in 
connection with the modification of payments creates a new legal 
detriment.215  Naturally, lenders are unlikely to make mention of these 
                                                 
211 See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of consideration 
and whether the actions taken by homeowners should constitute new consideration or 
simply the fulfilling of a previously established legal obligation). 
212 See In re Bank of Am., No. 10-md-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (D. Mass. July 6, 
2011) (denying the defense’s claim that there was a lack of consideration because of a pre-
existing legal duty); Stagikas v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. 795 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136 (D. Mass. 
2011) (citing In re Lloyd Carr & Co., 617 F.2d 882, 890 (1st Cir. 1980)); Bosque v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351–52 (D. Mass. 2011) (denying the defendant’s 
proposition that there was a pre-existing duty because the partial payments under TPP 
should be considered as previously obligated in the mortgage agreement). 
213 In re Bank of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4; Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136; Fletcher v. 
OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 352; 
Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., No. 10-CV-10380-RGS, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3 (D. 
Mass. Nov. 24, 2010). 
214 Compare Rackley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-387-XR, 2011 WL 
2971357, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2011) (“Plaintiff was already obligated to disclose to 
JPMC his financial information under his original loan document . . . .”), with In re Bank of 
Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4 (stating that a “provision of financial information and trial 
payments” constituted consideration). 
215 See Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (quoting Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3); In re Bank 
of Am., 2011 WL 2637222, at *4; Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (quoting Durmic, 2010 WL 
4825632, at *3); Fletcher, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 930–32; Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *3. 
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additional requirements, focusing on the payments as pre-existing legal 
duties, which cannot constitute consideration.216 
2. Does the TPP Constitute as an Offer with Material Terms? 
An offer is an intention by one party to enter into a bargain, thus 
inviting another party into an agreement.217  The difficulty in 
determining what is an actual offer is trying to construe the intentions of 
the parties and what exactly all parties involved intended.218  When 
evaluating the material terms and HAMP, the argument that the TPP 
agreement cannot constitute a contract emphasizes that the TPP lacks 
repayment dates, amounts of repayments, interest rates for a permanent 
modification, a principal amount, and the amount to be paid into escrow, 
among other things.219  However, it can be argued that the terms laid out 
in the TPP agreement, together with HAMP itself, are sufficient to make 
the TPP a binding loan modification agreement.220  Alternatively, even if 
the TPP is not itself a permanent loan modification agreement, it is at 
least an agreement to modify the terms of the loan at a later date should 
the borrowers uphold their end of the bargain.221 
An alternative interpretation to TPP contract theory is that TPP is 
only an “estimate” or “part of the application process.”222  Under this 
                                                 
216 Compare Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10–987–AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *7 (D. Or. 
Dec. 13, 2010) (making exclusive mention of payments rather than the other legal 
detriments which proponents have stated), and Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4 (discussing 
the pre-existing duty to make payments and disclose financial information), with Bosque, 
762 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (asserting that modified mortgage payments alone would not suffice 
for consideration), and Stagikas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (stating that modified mortgage 
payments alone would not be suitable for consideration). 
217 Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (quoting Bourque v. FDIC, 42 F.3d 704, 709 (1st Cir. 
1994)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 
218 See Grill v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 10–CV–03057–FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 
127891, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011) (quoting Banner Entm’t, Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. 
Cnty., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598 (1998)).  This case discusses the need for a meeting of the minds 
on all material points.  Id.  See also Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (discussing the defense’s 
claims of a lack of definite and essential terms); Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4 (discussing 
the defense’s claim that there was not a suitable contract due to a lack of material terms). 
219 Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 352; Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4; see Belyea v. Litton 
Loan Servicing, LLP, No. 10–10931–DJC, 2011 WL 2884964, at *8 (D. Mass. July 15, 2011). 
220 See supra notes 130–33 (evidencing that there were sufficient terms to avoid a 
dismissal of the case).  The Durmic court found that there was sufficient evidence to allow 
standing but that a full hearing was needed in order to decipher the intent of the parties.  
Durmic, 2010 WL 4825632, at *4. 
221 See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text (determining that the terms were 
sufficient for further exploration in a full trial). 
222 Rackley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-387-XR, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4 
(W.D. Tex. July 21, 2011); Grill v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 10-CV-03057-
FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 127891, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011). 
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rationale, the greatest problem facing borrowers is the requirement for a 
lender to send a modification agreement.223  Rackley provides an 
illustration of the difficulties facing borrowers in that the TPP itself states 
that “[i]f prior to the Modification Effective Date, (I) the Lender does not 
provide [the borrower] a fully executed copy of this Plan and the 
Modification Agreement. . . . the Loan Documents will not be modified 
and this Plan will terminate.”224  Although most cases to date have 
involved signed contracts, borrowers are now able to accept simply 
through performance, but this could potentially expose them to a statute 
of frauds defense by servicers in some states.225  However, the borrower 
can always argue partial performance as a counter argument to statute of 
frauds.226 
These differing positions need to be reconciled to provide a clear 
direction for homeowners attempting to save their homes.227 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
It seems likely that third party beneficiary standing will not survive 
the scrutiny of most courts and that there is a limited opportunity for 
TPP contractual obligation theory.228  However, there is a possibility that 
the argument asserting that TPP agreements create a new contract could 
gain steam.  This argument might become an accepted basis for standing 
in the First Circuit due to its support in Massachusetts and has already 
been accepted by the Seventh Circuit in the Wigod case under state 
common law.229 
HAMP has not only become a frustration for many borrowers but a 
source of embarrassment to the Treasury Department and a non-
incentivizing program to the service providers.230  HAMP will be 
                                                 
223 See Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4 (stating that a modification agreement may only be 
executed if all obligations were performed, including the borrower receipt of a lender-
executed modification); Grill, 2011 WL 127891, at *4 (explaining that if a borrower follows 
all the rules, then the lender will send a modification agreement for a signature). 
224 Rackley, 2011 WL 2971357, at *4. 
225 Cook-Mack & Parady, supra note 16, at 377. 
226 Id. 
227 See infra Part IV (providing solutions to allow homeowners to bring private actions). 
228 See supra Part III (evidencing the court’s reluctance to provide third party beneficiary 
standing to borrowers and maintaining that the TPP creation of a new contract theory has 
been limited predominantly to Massachusetts district courts). 
229 See supra Part III.B (discussing the various arguments for and against creating a 
contract under TPP agreements).  See generally Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 
547 (7th Cir. 2012). 
230 See Morgenson, supra note 11 (demonstrating some of the frustration, disgust, and lack 
of faith that borrowers and agencies involved with borrowers are having).  See generally 
Braucher, supra note 2; Gottlieb & Natarelli, supra note 25, at 541 (discussing HAMP’s lack 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 [2012], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss1/7
2012] Help or Hamp(er)? 309 
expiring December 31, 2013. 231  Lawmakers need to decide what should 
happen now.  Should the HAMP program be extended in its current 
form?  Should the current legislation be modified?  Should a decision be 
made to let HAMP lapse and be supplanted by alternative Making 
Home Affordable Programs?  Or is the entire HAMP program a failure? 
Assuming that the HAMP program is renewed or its aims are 
incorporated into other programs, the effectiveness of the program will 
hinge on whether the government provides an explicit remedy for 
homeowners in the SPA.  Service providers and the government are 
likely to agree that the right to private action should be limited and not 
available to everyone who has a home loan and a desire to modify.  
However, as recognized by the courts, HAMP “undoubtedly has a goal 
of assisting homeowners,” and therefore a remedy should be provided to 
those who have jumped through certain hoops.232  This Note submits 
that HAMP should continue and that those who have been enrolled in 
the TPP program and made their payments as required should explicitly 
be given standing in the Making Home Affordable Handbook.233  This 
Note suggests that such a clause in the SPA should state as follows: 
Upon successful enrollment into the TPP, the borrower will be 
designated as a third party beneficiary to this Servicer 
Participation Agreement and thus given standing to bring 
forth private action based upon the Servicer Participation 
Agreement.  The servicer’s receipt of ‘the first payment 
due under the TPP Notice on or before the last day of 
the month in which the first payment is due (TPP offer 
deadline) . . . [will be] evidence of the borrower’s 
acceptance of the TPP Notice and its terms and 
conditions.’234  However, otherwise eligible borrowers will 
lose the right to private action under this Servicer 
                                                                                                             
of success in the first year and reasons why the mortgage servicers do not like the 
program).  But see Massad, supra note 26 (providing increased incentives to participating 
mortgage servicers). 
231 Homeowner Frequently Asked Questions, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/faqs/homeowner-faqs/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2011). 
232 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (evidencing the courts’ recognition that 
HAMP was created with struggling homeowners in mind).  Therefore, borrowers should 
have some level of protection that would not be accorded if action can only be taken by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
233 See generally Handbook 3.4, supra note 9 (providing the guidelines and rules for which 
servicers are held, based upon their SPAs). 
234 Handbook 2.0, supra note 44. 
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Participation Agreement if they have falsified any of the 
documentation or have failed to provide modified payments.235 
The obvious question relating to the proposed solution is: “What 
happens if HAMP is not renewed?”  Even if HAMP is not renewed the 
issues raised by the shortcomings of the HAMP program will continue to 
be relevant.  Other programs that might be developed in the future, as 
part of the Making Home Affordable Program, can and should provide 
standing to private citizens to enforce their rights.  Standing should not 
necessarily be extended to all homeowners, but it should be extended to 
those who meet the defined threshold requirements, which would pare 
down the possible number of qualified litigants. 
The proposed change to HAMP and other potential future programs 
would alleviate the conflict between (a) getting TARP money into the 
hands of homeowners and holding servicers accountable and (b) massive 
litigation which could seriously burden the courts. 
Some may argue that the proposed changes are simply a Band-Aid 
upon a flesh wound.236  There are still issues of potential failure by the 
homeowners to make their modified payments, or the possibility that 
even if homeowners are heard, they may be unsuccessful in their claims.  
However, the ability to be heard will at least provide borrowers with 
more leverage in negotiating a modification or new deal, as well as 
providing an opportunity for discovery.  In its current form, many of the 
service providers are insulated from even discovery and can simply roll 
the dice on whether or not Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will enforce the 
SPA agreement.237 
Perhaps the greatest concern is that if such a change were to be made 
to the Handbook then servicers will choose to opt out.  According to 
section 10.C of the SPA, changes to the “rights, duties, or obligations of 
Participating Servicers” will allow the servicer to opt out.238  Under 
section 10.C the servicer is required to continue providing services where 
the documentation existed prior to the changes in the Handbook.239  This 
                                                 
235 See, e.g., Handbook 3.4, supra note 9.  The author recommends adding the new clause 
following section 8.7 Alternative Loss Mitigation Options as section 8.8 “Right to Private 
Action Stemming from the TPP.”  Italicized portions are the author’s proposed 
amendments to the guidelines. 
236 See generally Braucher, supra note 2 (discussing all of the difficulties that HAMP faced 
in its first year, not only with the banks but also the homeowners). 
237 See supra note 59 (discussing compliance enforcement options allowed by the SPA). 
238 SPA Agreement, supra note 59, at section 10. 
239 Id. at section 5.C.  Section 5.C states the following: 
Following the Servicer’s election to opt out of the Second Lien 
Modification Program, the Servicer will not be required to perform any 
Services for any new mortgage loans under the Second Lien 
Modification Program; however, the Servicer must continue to 
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would mean that anyone who has begun the process of trying to gain a 
modification or has successfully received a modification would continue 
to be protected under the previous guidelines.  Nonetheless, it is a 
reasonable fear that some servicers may choose to no longer offer 
modifications and that the program may lose some opportunities to 
provide modifications to borrowers. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this Note, the story of a hypothetical family 
illustrates the feelings of helplessness and anger about the inability to 
control the disposition of their home.  The HAMP legislation was 
purportedly designed specifically to address the needs of a family like 
the one described. 
This Note has explored two questions: (1) Does the borrower have 
standing as a third party beneficiary of HAMP to assert a claim based on 
mortgage servicers’ alleged violations of HAMP, and (2) Does the 
borrower have standing under traditional contract law, the law of 
implied contracts or promissory estoppel, in cases where the borrower 
was a participant in the Trial Period Plan (TPP) of HAMP and followed 
the requirements of TPP but was nevertheless denied a loan 
modification? 
The arguments for allowing borrowers to sue the mortgage 
providers seem to have little traction in the courts at this time.  Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae enforcement provisions have failed to protect the 
class of citizens that the HAMP program was created to serve.  For many 
borrowers, this failure is already a reality.  For those currently enrolled 
in the program, it may be that they cannot be helped because the 
previous terms would be applicable.  The current legislation expires in 
December 2013.  There is widespread opinion that this ineffective 
program should not continue in its current form. 
However, the need for government aid still exists.  Many Americans 
are still reeling and trying to maintain their homes, and it is vitally 
important to provide protection for them.  If the HAMP program is to be 
salvaged, a more meaningful enforcement mechanism must emerge. 
Allowing borrowers who have satisfied the requirements of the 
program to sue lenders for noncompliance seems like a reasonable 
approach.  By setting a compliance threshold for standing the courts 
would not be clogged with suits from every disgruntled homeowner; 
                                                                                                             
perform any Services for any mortgage loan for which it had already 
begun performing Services prior to electing to opt out of the Second 
Lien Modification Program. 
Id. 
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rather, this new approach would provide a remedy for mortgage holders 
who have performed their duties under HAMP and who have a 
reasonable case that they were unjustly denied modification. 
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